By: Omid Rahimi
 
Introduction
Iran’s 13th government leading by former President Ibrahim Raisi pursued a relatively coherent policy towards Central Asia which was totally different to Rouhani Administration. With the testimony of president Rasisi and early presidential elections which lead to presidency of Pezeshkian, the process seems to be stopped and at least went in a state of uncertainty. In this regard, one of the key priorities of the new Iranian government will be to get a deep understanding of this process and implementing the foreign policy in accordance with this process.
Raisi’s Foreign Policy toward Central Asia
Raisi’s administration started its work in special conditions of the foreign policy. While the previous administration spent most of the energy to sign the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the 5+1, the government handed over in a situation where these efforts were organized to keep the JCPOA alive. Eight years of arduous efforts and focus on international levels such as the nuclear issue and interaction with the West caused a noticeable imbalance in Iran's foreign policy towards neighboring countries. In such a situation, the logical and natural behavior of foreign policy was formation of a negative balance aimed at recovering balance, which was placed on the agenda of the 13th government. Considering this understanding and the existing situation, president Raisi focused his foreign policy on the revival or restoration of the neighborhood policy. In this regard, regional approaches were prioritized rather than international trends, and the pragmatic development of relations with neighbors was placed on the agenda of the then government, which also affected the relations with Central Asia.
There were two serious political crises with Tajikistan and Turkmenistan when the 13^th government started working. After the events of September 2015, Iran’s relation with Tajikistan got so critical and the two countries experienced unprecedented tensions, and due to this situation Tajikistan was considered the most acute issue in Iran's foreign policy in Central Asia. After banning the activities of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) and declaring the party as a terrorist organization, in an anti-Iranian approach, Tajikistan closed down Iranian centers such as cultural offices and centers and Imam Khomeini Relief Committee and developed its interactions with anti-Iranian groups and actors. Issues such as the case of Babak Zanjani's assets in Tajikistan added to the complexity of the relations between the two Persian speaking countries. Despite constructive actions such as not hosting the IRPT members and efforts to restore relations, due to various reasons, until 2021 and the 13th government took office, this restoration of bilateral relations was not accompanied by tangible results. The change in the foreign policy approach of the Raisi’s administration focused on the neighborhood policy was a factor that also led to the gradual change in the behavior of the Tajikistan and led to important constructive interactions such as new defense-military relations (the opening of the Ababil drone production line in Tajikistan) and political-security convergence (by adopting decisions such as visa free regime).
There were also serious political challenges in Iran-Turkmenistan relations. The disagreement between the two countries regarding the pricing of gas imported from Turkmenistan increased the level of political tensions. The disputes were not resolved in the framework of bilateral negotiations and referred to international courts. As a result of these disagreements, the political challenges between the two countries deepened. The President of Turkmenistan didn’t visit Tehran for about six years and the level of trade between the two countries decreased to less than one tenth. Of course, Covid-19 pandemic was also an influential factor. However, the political challenges were mainly resolved during the 3 years of Raisi administration. Hence, in addition to resolving the disputes between the two countries on the gas issue, a new gas swap agreement was reached on the Turkmenistan-Iran-Azerbaijan route.
This approach that could be considered as Iran’s new pivot to Central Asia, included bilateral interactions as well. Raisi's first foreign visit was to Tajikistan. The visit was considered as the starting point of Iran's neighborhood policy towards Central Asia that led to the start of Iran's permanent membership process in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the improvement of relations with Tajikistan. Three months later, President Raisi made another foreign visit to Ashgabat for participating in the ECO summit and the gas swap agreement was signed in a trilateral side meeting. In both visits, bilateral meetings were held with the leaders of Central Asian republics. A year later, in July 2022, other visits were made to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan where Raisi’s visit to Uzbekistan was significantly important. In the same year, president Raisi made another trip to Astana, with the aim of participating in the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and in this visit also important bilateral documents were signed with Kazakhstan. A year later, Raisi again visited Uzbekistan with the aim of participating in the ECO Summit and then visited Dushanbe for more bilateral relations with Tajikistan. Carrying out seven official visits to Central Asia in less than three years was an unprecedented approach to this region during the last decade.
The visits of high-ranking officials from Central Asia to Tehran were also significant in this period. During Raisi’s administration long spells regarding the visit of Central Asian leaders to Iran were broken. Emomali Rahmon, the president of Tajikistan, visited Tehran after 9 years in May 2022. In the framework of this visit, 17 cooperation documents were signed, which was unprecedented. The second important and strategic visit to Tehran was made by Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the President of Uzbekistan. It was the first official visit of Mirziyoyev to Tehran after coming to power in 2017 and the first visit of the president of Uzbekistan to Iran after about two decades. For Turkmenistan that experienced some challenging relations with Iran, after seven years, we witnessed the first visit of Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedow to Tehran. Serdar Berdimuhamedow had visited Tehran a earlier as the deputy prime minister of Turkmenistan. A more important visit was made to Tehran the next year by Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, the national leader of Turkmenistan, which marked the beginning of changes in bilateral relations. The president and prime minister of Kazakhstan were other high-ranking officials from Central Asia who officially visited Tehran and signed a number of bilateral documents.
These political approaches were strengthened during the new institutionalist and multilateralist approaches to Eurasian international organizations. The process of Iran's permanent membership in the SCO, which was pursued during Rouhani’s administration, was concluded by Raisi. In the context of ECO, the periodic chairmanship of Central Asian countries was a stimulus to strengthen interactions with Central Asia and implement previous agreements, which of course were done at the political level. Regarding the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), the promotion of the preferential trade agreement to the free trade agreement was concluded. I would be significant in promoting trade and economic relations with member states such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as observers like Uzbekistan. During Raisi’s administration Iran also proposed initiatives towards Afghanistan in partnership with Central Asia and had an effective participation in multilateral political frameworks, such as the summits of Afghanistan's neighbors. Iran also participated at lower levels within the framework of other Eurasian organizations such as the CIS and the CARIC.
The trade and economic ties were also affected by this political approach. While under the influence of the coldness of the political relations between Iran and Central Asia during 2013-2021 and the consequences Covid-19 pandemic trade turnover between Iran and Central Asia decreased significantly, since the beginning of the 13th government As a result of the improvement of political relations and some measures to facilitate bilateral trade, the growth process of trade between Iran and Central Asia began. As a result, despite the fact that in 2017 and before the Covid-19, the total trade turnover between Iran and Central Asia was less than 1$ billion (reached less than 700$ million during pandemic), during the first year of Raisi’s presidency it reached 1.5$ billion and increased to more than 1.6$ billion in the next year.
New Regional trends and situation
The 13th government ended in a situation with the testimony of president Raisi and his companions that Central Asia was in a very complicated situation. Obviously, the 14th government led by Pezeshkian should start working in such a situation, and in this regard, a deep and multifaceted understanding of the intertwining of regional developments is considered a key factor for any type of policy making and policy implementation. Among these, four influencing factors on new regional trends can be evaluated:
1. Russo-Ukrainian War and its implications to World, Eurasia and Central Asia
The war in Ukraine has had deep and sometimes superficial effects on Central Asia at different levels and in different fields. The main consequence of this war in Central Asia include the significant security-political sensitivity of Russia, the strengthening of USA’s approach towards Central Asia, the West's pivot to Central Asia as a new battleground or at least power competition field with Russia and even China, and the pragmatic approach of Central Asian states toward balancing and achieving the maximum benefit from the power competitions. These trends have shaped the recent developments of the region with a dynamic process of influencing the behavior of Central Asian states.
2. The Taliban takeover
The fall of Afghanistan’s government which led to the Taliban take over could affect Central Asia through the stability and security in Afghanistan, the competition of international and regional powers in new Afghanistan and interaction with the Taliban, the Taliban's ability to control military groups, and drug trafficking cartels working in Afghanistan, the international recognition of the Taliban governance, and the possibility of developing geo-economic infrastructure projects in Afghanistan.
3. Islamic State – Khorasan Province activities in North Afghanistan and Central Asia
The activities of ISKP have increased in the last two years. These activities may affect Central Asia through the securitization of the space in the region, creating legitimacy for military intervention by international powers and redefining security cooperation between Central Asia and great powers and promoting international security trends in Central Asia.
4. The security and tense atmosphere of Southwest Asia
Although this factor has not independently affected the developments in Central Asia, some recent developments have shown that it is possible to consider a kind of “linking order” between Central Asia and Southwest Asia. Currently, affected by the Israel invasion on Gaza and the new trends in relations with the Zionist regime, and especially the new interactions of the Central Asian countries with the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, this security environment in Southwest Asia has had an impact on Central Asia as well. On the other hand, the deep influence of Iran’s regional policies from these developments makes the influence even at low levels, more serious.
Implications for Pezeshkian’s Administration
Raisi’s administration presented a significant and improved pivot to Central Asia in comparison to Rouhani’s administration, which is remarkable and worthy of praise. However, this performance was still weaker compared to the previous periods, that is, during the presidency of Ahmadinejad, and especially Hashemi Rafsanjani (during the 1990s). Part of this weakness goes back to the fundamentals of Iran's foreign policy behavior. Because historically, the strategic policy of Iran in Central Asia suffers from a "lack of coherence in strategic behaviors". This issue can be seen as a serious issue for a long time in the performance of Iran’s foreign policy toward Central Asia.
For now, in addition to the fact that Iran should strengthen the opportunity-oriented view along with the deepening of the strategic connectivity with the Central Asian region, Tehran also needs a pragmatic prioritization towards the region. So far, the prioritization of Iran's foreign policy behavior has been based on time and place requirements and short-term characteristics, and less defined in a strategic process. Hence, Iran's "reactive" approach instead of "purposeful activism" has been a kind of weakness in Iran's foreign policy towards Central Asia during the last two decades. In this regard the new administration leading by president Pezeshkian should pay attention to the following implications in its foreign policy towards Central Asia:
-        A key factor in Iran's regional understanding (including structural understanding and also at the level of foreign policy agents) is to overcome the traditional Russian-oriented view towards Central Asia. In the current situation, Central Asia should be seen as a multipolar space, in which the main poles are not only international powers, but also emerging actors and regional powers.
-        The 14th government is expected to maintain and strengthen the neighborhood policy approach of the 13th government towards Central Asia, while dealing with structural weaknesses, and implement a more pragmatic foreign policy (regardless of the interactions with the West or security developments in Southwest Asia) towards this region. Therefore, as a strategic implication, strengthening Iran’s pivot to Central Asia in order to compensate for the strategic backwardness in the last decade is very important.
-        A special focus on the geo-economic opportunities can have a strategic importance for Iran in Central Asia. In this framework, it is necessary for the 14^th government to purposefully rule this approach on the interactions between Iran and Central Asia.
-        Iran's previous market in Central Asia was about 5$ billion, which has now decreased to a third. Hence, the 14^th government should formulate a “business development program” with a threefold jump in trade turnover with Central Asia in the short term and implement it. Obviously, its prerequisite is to strengthen the political foundations and then to optimize business processes and facilitate them.
-        Continuing the process of restoring political relations with Tajikistan, which began in the 12th government and continued in Raisi’s administration, some key issues with Dushanbe were resolved. However a significant part of the existing issues are kept silent so that they can be resolved in the future under the shadow of improving political and security relations. It is exactly the mission of the 14^th government to implement a key upgrade in this approach, using the achievements of the 13^th government.