By: IESS, Central Asia Working Group
 

What will you read in this report

1. Introduction              2. Opportunities and Challenges of Iran-Tajikistan Strategic Relations              3. Factors of Strategic Convergence Between Iran and Tajikistan

Deepening of Iran's Strategic View Toward Tajikistan
 
Introduction
Since 2015, the relationship between Iran and Tajikistan has entered a new phase, and it seems unlikely that the situation prior to that time can be restored in the short term. During this period, Iran's strategic engagement in Tajikistan and Central Asia shifted from an active to a potential role, alongside a gradual decline in Iran's regional strategy in Central Asia. Despite the strategic weaknesses and challenges that emerged after these developments, it is essential to implement more effective structures and components in bilateral relations, based on new realities, to achieve maximum mutual benefits in the current circumstances.
This requires a precise understanding of the general principles governing bilateral relations, a pragmatic assessment of the new conditions, and continuous attention to the root causes of the new situation, which involves a combination of various opportunities and challenges. This article will review the key opportunities and challenges facing Iran-Tajikistan relations and outline the principal components for redefining Iran's strategic approach.

Opportunities and Challenges of Iran-Tajikistan Strategic Relations
 Several opportunities and challenges in the strategic relations between Iran and Tajikistan can be evaluated.

Opportunities
The first and most significant opportunity is the presence of a large majority of Persian-speaking and Iranian-origin individuals in Tajikistan, who feel a strong identity bond with Iran, with many pro-Iranian elites among them.
Another opportunity is Tajik identity, which includes large ethnic minorities in neighboring countries and even Russia. The civilizational significance of the Tajiks and their historical and cultural dominance in Tajikistan is a strategic advantage that has yet to be fully realized. In fact, a strategic approach to uniting Tajiks beyond ethnic boundaries as a "regional order-defining variable" has not been pursued so far, while Russian and Turkic-centric alternatives have been more prominent in Central Asia.
Finally, the last strategic opportunity related to Tajikistan is its geographical location, connected to Afghanistan, which provides the potential to establish a "geocultural axis" based on Persian culture and civilization. This could present a strategic outlook for both Iran and Tajikistan. The strategic arms of the Islamic Republic of Iran in regional and international cooperation include the Islamic-Shia axis in the west and the Iranian-Persian axis in the east, with Afghanistan and Tajikistan serving as its strategic extension.

Challenges
Alongside the opportunities, several strategic and, at times, tactical challenges also exist in the path of alignment and strategic partnership between Iran and Tajikistan. One obstacle is the presence of different political views between the two countries, which hinders the realization of the above-mentioned opportunities. The strategic thinking and political structures governing the two countries should be aligned to truly recognize Tajikistan’s strategic role in Central Asia.
The second obstacle is Russia’s influence. The plan to undermine Tajik unity in Central Asia was initiated by the Russians. This plan continued due to the fear of the aforementioned strategic advantages and was partially successful. Currently, Russia’s deep and relatively widespread influence also prevents the realization of many of the opportunities for closer cooperation between Iran and Tajikistan.
The third challenge is the experience of civil war and the relative stability following the war, which has led to a form of conservatism in Tajik society and its elites due to a constant fear of political and security instability. However, the factor of time and the emergence of a new generation of elites will likely diminish this challenge.
Finally, the most significant threat in today’s Tajikistan is the efforts of certain extremist groups to network and recruit Central Asian nationals, including Tajiks, to join terrorist organizations. At the first level, this factor is effective as an operational and destabilizing factor; and at the second level, it weakens the strategic advantages of the Tajiks in the historical and civilizational sphere. This weakening process seems to be intensifying under the leadership of Turkey or the currents close to pro-Russian and pro-Turkic tendencies.

Factors of Strategic Convergence Between Iran and Tajikistan
In light of the opportunities, challenges, and obstacles affecting Iran-Tajikistan relations, as well as recent regional developments, any effort to deepen strategic relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Tajikistan must take the following considerations and factors into account:

1.  Establishing any form of strategic partnership between two political entities requires a shared basket of mutual interests and economic benefits, which serves as a key driver and reinforcing factor. In bilateral strategic interactions, economics, trade, and material advantages play a dominant role in realizing potential capacities and turning opportunities into tangible outcomes. Therefore, the economic factor should never be overlooked, or regarded as a secondary and non-strategic factor in strengthening bilateral relations.
   2. In Tajikistan, hybrid ideological groups—such as those combining nationalism with religious sentiment or religious groups with national-civilizational inclinations—have not yet fully developed, unlike in Iran. Therefore, even Iran-oriented groups or national - civilizational groups with weaker religious affiliations can contribute to the social and cultural foundation for deepening strategic convergence between the two countries. It appears that external actors, such as Russia and the West, have deliberately sought to create and reinforce a perceived divide between secular nationalist movements and Islamist factions in Tajikistan, promoting a binary opposition between pro-Iran and Islamist groups. In the long run, this trend could weaken strategic interactions between Iran and Tajikistan.
   3. Since 2015, Tajikistan’s public opinion regarding Iran has been subjected to a heavy media onslaught from various sources, including Russian-oriented, Western-oriented, and even secondary factions aligned with Turkey and Arab states. Public opinion is a crucial arena for fostering strategic power-building convergence and cooperation, whether in normative power or economic influence. Thus, in strengthening Iran-Tajikistan relations, careful attention must be given to all aspects of public perception at every level.
   4. The Islamic Republic of Iran, leveraging its technological, engineering, infrastructural, economic, and regional capacities, can carry out joint projects in Central Asia, prioritizing Tajikistan. These projects can be designed and implemented at different levels and with different audiences, in a way that covers different segments of Tajik society. In the economic sphere, while trade between the two countries has grown moderately over the past three years, current trade figures still do not reflect the full potential of bilateral capacities. Iran must aim to achieve a balanced presence alongside Russia and China in Tajikistan in the short term. With appropriate governmental support, this objective is feasible in both sides. Additionally, Iran should expand its economic interactions with Tajikistan into strategic and sustainable domains, both through direct and indirect initiatives. The current trade model lacks sustainability, requiring investments in infrastructure, alternative employment opportunities for migrant workers, engagement in Tajikistan’s strategic goods sector, and similar measures.
   5. Iran should assist Tajikistan in reclaiming and strengthening its strategic regional and international position—not only as a strategic partner but also as the final link in the "geocultural axis" of Persian culture and civilization. A crucial aspect of this effort involves supporting Tajikistan in rebuilding and institutionalizing a cultural-civilizational movement with a strategic vision for reviving the geopolitical and historical role of Tajiks in Central Asia.
   6. Given the dominance of the Pashtun political system and the increasing challenges facing Persian culture and language in Afghanistan, Iran-Tajikistan strategic convergence should, in the medium term, contribute to improving the political and social conditions of non-Pashtun ethnic groups within Afghanistan—which is the central connecting link of the Iran-Tajikistan cultural-civilizational axis.
   7. A fundamental dimension of any strategic bilateral cooperation involves joint security and defense initiatives to counter and contain local and regional extremism, particularly the threat posed by Islamic State of Khorasan (ISKP). The ongoing expansion of ISKP recruitment networks in Central Asia—especially the continuous recruitment of Tajik nationals—poses a long-term challenge not only to the security and political landscape of Tajikistan and Afghanistan but also to their cultural and social stability.

 
Institute for East Strategic Studies (IESS), Central Asia Working Group