By: Omid Rahimi; Researcher at the Institute for East Strategic Studies
 
 

Table of contents:                 1. Introduction        2. Trump’s Policy Towards Central Asia During His Previous Term (2017-2021)        3. Strategic Outcomes of Trump’s New Policy in Central Asia

 
Introduction
Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential elections will have profound implications for U.S. policies on both global and regional levels. His departure from broad frameworks of U.S. foreign policy, and the unpredictability of his decisions and behavior posed significant challenges for many nations.
Following his victory, Central Asian governments, especially Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, were among the first high-ranking officials to congratulate Trump, signaling the importance of these relations for the Central Asia region. At the same time, China, Russia, Iran, and Afghanistan are as four main focal points of Trump’s foreign policy in the surrounding environment of Central Asia. This encirclement of Central Asia among the main issues of American foreign policy, which are generally of the nature of geopolitical crises, created challenging conditions for the region.
Therefore, Understanding the strategic outcomes of Trump’s foreign policy towards Central Asia after his return to power becomes a critical issue for these nations. Naturally, this strategy will also affect the interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Trump’s Policy Towards Central Asia During His Previous Term (2017-2021)
During Trump’s first term (January 2017 to January 2021), there was no concentrated U.S. policy toward Central Asia, and the level of relations did not significantly change.
So, one notable feature of Trump’s approach was U.S. neglect towards Central Asia. Rex Tillerson, Trump’s Secretary of State from 2017 to 2018, did not meet with Central Asian leaders, symbolizing this disregard. This issue provoked some reactions in Central Asia.
 However, Uzbekistan’s President Mirziyoyev’s historic visit to Washington - which came after a long period of tension with the United States under Karimov - marked a significant development; although it was primarily driven by Tashkent rather than Washington.
Another characteristic of Trump’s first term was the reduction in the budget of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), leading to a relative stagnation of USAID activities in Central Asia.
 However, Trump adopted a different approach regarding appointments, deploying a more assertive team in Central Asia. These appointments are among Trump's steps forward in Central Asia, for example, the appointment of retired military officer Klimov to the diplomatic mission in Turkmenistan in 2019, with experience working in NATO; the appointment of Daniel Rosenblum, a Jewish activist in Uzbekistan who was later reassigned to Kazakhstan during Biden’s presidency and transferred to the US embassy in Astana; and the appointment of Pomersheim to Tajikistan, with a good security background.  
Trump also appointed Donald Lu as ambassador to Kyrgyzstan. Lu’s successful performance led to his appointment as deputy assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia during the Biden presidency, creating an additional level of mobility.
Another notable point regarding the decisions of the Trump administration during this period was the approval of a five-year US strategy towards Central Asia in 2020. However, this strategy almost continued previous US policies in Central Asia, in a way that did not make any significant changes at the operational level and did not differ significantly from previous US strategies.
 Therefore, apart from the use of stronger human resources at the level of the regional diplomatic staff, we practically did not witness any particular movement in Trump’s relations with Central Asia during the previous period.
However, initial estimates indicate that Trump's strategy towards Central Asia in the new period will likely be different from the past. This difference is mainly due to Trump's change in approach and experience, as well as the changes that have occurred in the regional conditions of Eurasia and the world after the war in Ukraine and the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Strategic Outcomes of Trump’s New Policy in Central Asia
Given evolving circumstances in Central Asia, influenced by international dynamics, Trump’s foreign policy towards the region is expected to yield some strategic outcomes distinct from his earlier term. The most important of these outcomes are assessed as follows:

1. Russia-U.S. Relations
Trump’s approach to Central Asia will heavily depend on U.S.-Russia relations. The Trump administration will be particularly focused on resolving the Ukraine crisis, in order to shift the focus of US global strategic attention from Eurasia to the Pacific. This means reducing potential interventions and conflicts in Eurasia.
However, in the last days of the Democrats and the Biden administration, they have authorized an attack deep into Russian territory through Ukraine, using American and European weapons. This development has triggered a wide-ranging tension not only between Russia and Ukraine, but also with Europe and the United States.
This decision makes it difficult for Trump’s political initiatives to reach any relative agreement with Russia, and could affect Russia-US relations and, subsequently, Central Asia. However, given the supportive presence of Republicans in the Senate and Congress, it is expected Trump will still have a lot of power over Democrats in the United States.

2. Anti-China Developments in Central Asia
In contrast to his relatively positive and optimistic view of Russia, Trump has shown a very tough view of China. This could lead to an increase in the intensity of US-centered anti-China activities in Central Asia, the initial nuclei of which were formed in the previous Trump administration (which, of course, decreased during the Biden administration due to the focus on Ukraine).
According to American sources, the Trump administration has now prepared a very broad and international plan to contain China in various industrial, commercial, technological, political and security areas, which will probably include Central Asia. The plans to contain China include expanding anti-China sanctions, implementing security measures, as well as applying political pressure to limit China in Central Asia, and even escalating tensions with the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.
China’s response to these actions could lead to a change in its strategic behavior in Central Asia, especially in the security sphere. However, anti-China developments in Central Asia will be a function of developments in Taiwan and the management of tensions in the South China Sea. In other words, Central Asia has a secondary position in the Trump administration’s anti-China strategy, while it had a primary position in Biden’s policy against Russia.

3. U.S. Engagement in the Region
After the Ukraine war, the Biden administration focused on developing and enhancing relations with Central Asia, due to its consistent anti-Russian policies and some other developments, such as the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the rise of the Taliban in the country. The most important outcome of this strategy was the holding of the first US-Central Asia 5+1 summit at the leaders' level, which is considered an unprecedented move in bilateral relations. At the same time, US aid to Central Asia also increased, and Washington began to make more efforts in the areas of regional infrastructure, economy, politics, culture, and security in Central Asia.
     However, it is difficult to predict whether this approach will continue or decline during the Trump era. In this regard, three very likely scenarios can be put forward:

1. _ In the first scenario, given Trump’s less interest in Russia and anti-Russian activities and subsequent focus on Central Asian initiatives, relations at the bilateral level or in frameworks related to Central Asia may be limited. In this case, relations will remain solely at the level of peripheral environments such as Afghanistan.
   _ In the second scenario, it is considered that the increasing trend of US-Central Asian relations in recent years has not only been influenced by the views of the Biden administration and the issue of Russia, but also as a result of the enhancement of Central Asia’s strategic position at the regional and global levels. In this regard, Trump will also continue this trend as an inevitable choice. This strategy could lead to a continued increase in US influence and presence in the region. Given Trump’s greater pragmatism and greater power compared to Biden (due to the support of Congress and the Senate), this trend may even be strengthened and achieve more tangible results.
   _ The third scenario also focuses on developing relations. Although this scenario is weaker, it is related to Trump’s plans towards China. This means that if under the Biden administration, Russia was an influential factor in developing relations with Central Asia, under the Trump administration, China will be such a factor in these relations. Therefore, Trump’s focus on China with a different approach strengthens the US strategy in Central Asia. This may even bring cooperation or at least relative consent from Russia.

 

4. Economic and Energy Strategies
Given that economic strategies are among the key priorities of Trump’s foreign policy, economic projects initiated by the U.S. in Central Asia could gain greater traction in the new era. This strategy can be implemented on various levels and through numerous avenues.
First, within this framework, the trade of specific resources like lithium and cobalt (given the influence of oligarchs such as Elon Musk in the Trump administration) is expected to expand. Moreover, the U.S. may place greater focus on uranium, and also attention could be directed toward the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline project aimed at transporting gas from Turkmenistan to Europe.
The Trump's second strategy, at the global macroeconomic level, which may also affects Central Asia, is to increase oil production and reduce global oil prices. It appears that a sharp drop in oil prices, potentially as low as $50 per barrel, is part of Trump's plans. This approach could significantly concern Kazakhstan regarding revenue loss, while simultaneously facilitating its oil exports due to sanctions on Russia.
The third impactful economic decision by Trump regarding Central Asia may be on Uzbekistan’s membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). While this decision became politicized during the Biden administration, Trump might adopt a more pragmatic approach in this regard, due to his trade-related stance.

5. Sanctions
It appears that Trump will continue Biden's strategy concerning sanctions. Given the substantial benefits the U.S. gains from sanctions against Russia, it is expected that this issue will be excluded from any potential Trump initiative for peace in Ukraine. Instead, these sanctions might become even stricter, imposing greater pressure on Russia and, consequently, on Central Asia. A parallel trend involves the intensification of sanctions against China under Trump’s administration. Combined with maintaining and reinforcing U.S. sanctions on Russia and Iran, as well as potentially increasing measures against the Taliban, this could create a significant geoeconomic burden on Central Asia, effectively placing it within a sanctions barrier. Earlier, Mirziyoyev also pointed out that Central Asian countries have become the primary hostages of sanctions, leading to logistical challenges. The region’s response to this sanction pressure, and the U.S.’s approach to engaging with the region in the face of this pressure could become a key agenda item for the Trump administration in its relations with Central Asia.

6. Afghanistan’s Role
In the new era, Afghanistan also seems poised to remain an influential and, in fact, the most impactful element in Trump’s foreign policy regarding Central Asia. Trump has spoken out strongly against the withdrawal of US military forces from Afghanistan, indicating that he might reintroduce the issue of Afghanistan into his strategic agenda. However, given the unlikelihood of increased interventions in Afghanistan, it is possible that Trump will pursue a more assertive strategy than the Biden administration for establishing a military presence in Central Asia. This is particularly likely given the potential bargaining with Russia over Ukraine, and Tajikistan is likely to be the main option considered by the US here. If this fails, a significant increase in security and defense partnerships is expected in the current process.

7. Governance and Human Rights
Republican administrations in the U.S., particularly Trump, have previously shown less rigidity in ideological areas such as human rights, social freedoms, democracy, and related issues. They have often fostered better relations with authoritarian governments compared to Democratic administrations. In this respect, it is anticipated that a Trump administration would exhibit less sensitivity toward Central Asia in these domains compared to the Democrats, which could strengthen regional governments and even lead to U.S. alignment with power transition processes. However, in the event of Trump’s rigidity on certain issues, given his more pragmatic and aggressive strategies, instability in the region could be expected.
On the other hand, Trump’s potential strategies in this area could exacerbate the challenges faced by opposition groups in Central Asian countries; Conversely, relations with specific oligarchic circles, particularly in Kazakhstan, might expand further. Such interactions could contribute to reinforcing and stabilizing the current power structures in the region.