21 Nov 2024
Publish Date
Wednesday 6 November 2024 - 09:30
recommended
0
Taliban Rule After Three Years: Achievements and Failures
In evaluating the Taliban rule’s performance in the last 3 years, there are two approaches: “government establishment” approach, and “fulfilling expectations” approach. Analysts who follow the “government establishment” approach believe that the Taliban's military-security control over the entire geography of Afghanistan, and the formation of the police and army have been the most important functions of the Taliban government; something that the former government of Afghanistan could not handle in twenty years, with the support of NATO and the U.S. From this point of view, the process of defining "structures and mechanisms" of governance is a post-establishment phase, and therefore will be the next priority of the Taliban leaders. According to this view, the Taliban leaders will probably advance the path of forming a national government step by step and gradually. However, based on the “fulfilling expectations” approach, the Taliban has had enough time in its 3-year rule to implement major strategic plans, in order to develop its governance in the internal and external relations.
By: Waliullah Moradian
Theoretical approach
Three years is a very good time for any government to show its "type of operation" and "governance model". Currently, there are two approaches in evaluating the performance of the Taliban government after these three years: “government establishment” approach, and “fulfilling expectations” approach
The first approach: establishing the government
Analysts who analyze the performance of the Taliban government with this approach consider these three years as the period of "establishment of the Taliban government". This approach considers the military-security dominance over the entire geography of Afghanistan and establishing the police and army as the most important and fundamental performance of the Taliban government; something that the previous Afghan government could not do in twenty years - even with the support of NATO and the U.S. According to this approach, the last three years are considered as the stage of "establishment of the Taliban government."
From this point of view, the process of defining "structures and mechanisms" of the governance is a post-establishment phase, and therefore will be the next priority of the Taliban government. The Taliban leaders also declare the military-security establishment, as well as their dominance over the geography of Afghanistan, as the biggest achievement of their government. Some of the Taliban leaders even interpret the issues of military establishment and security as the main and ultimate goals of governance. However, according to the prevailing view, providing security is a tool, and the goal of governance is to achieve national development and national welfare.
The Taliban government’s behavior also shows that in the past three years, their leaders have focused more on the process of establishing the government and maintaining the security of the entire geography of Afghanistan, and less progress has been made in creating the structures and mechanisms necessary for a national government. In this regard, there are two types of interpretations: positive and negative.
In the positive interpretation, the Taliban leaders will probably advance the path of forming a national government step by step and gradually. It is based on this view that even after three years, the Taliban leaders still refer to their government as caretaker and temporary, and there is a hope that the Taliban government will seek to create a permanent structure with more inclusive indicators.
In a negative view, it is likely that the Taliban government - based on the traditional and customary view of politics - considers the current structures and mechanisms of its government as fixed elements, and seeks to strengthen its current model and structure of government, without making the reforms desired by the international community.
The second approach: fulfilling expectations and requirements
Based on this approach, every government has to adapt itself to its surrounding environment requirements and respond to basic expectations, in order to be able to survive and be effective. From this point of view, the Taliban government has faced basic domestic and international requirements and expectations from the beginning. Undoubtedly, failure to respond to these expectations will reduce the level of hope for the functioning of the Taliban government, and the potential of the Taliban in the direction of good governance will face serious damages and doubts.
According to this approach, a 3-year period is an enough time for a government to implement some major strategic plans, and to develop governance in the internal and external relations.
In this three-year period, the Taliban has made significant achievements in establishing and controlling the geography of Afghanistan. Despite this, the main question is whether the group has been able to take fundamental and sustainable steps in this three-year period, in line with the basic requirements of governance, and the basic expectations of the Afghans and the international community. In this report, we will answer this question.
Section one: the political situation of the Taliban government
Political studies and the experiences of governments shows that every newly established government must determine how to face three objective realities. These three facts are:
Theoretical approach
Three years is a very good time for any government to show its "type of operation" and "governance model". Currently, there are two approaches in evaluating the performance of the Taliban government after these three years: “government establishment” approach, and “fulfilling expectations” approach
The first approach: establishing the government
Analysts who analyze the performance of the Taliban government with this approach consider these three years as the period of "establishment of the Taliban government". This approach considers the military-security dominance over the entire geography of Afghanistan and establishing the police and army as the most important and fundamental performance of the Taliban government; something that the previous Afghan government could not do in twenty years - even with the support of NATO and the U.S. According to this approach, the last three years are considered as the stage of "establishment of the Taliban government."
From this point of view, the process of defining "structures and mechanisms" of the governance is a post-establishment phase, and therefore will be the next priority of the Taliban government. The Taliban leaders also declare the military-security establishment, as well as their dominance over the geography of Afghanistan, as the biggest achievement of their government. Some of the Taliban leaders even interpret the issues of military establishment and security as the main and ultimate goals of governance. However, according to the prevailing view, providing security is a tool, and the goal of governance is to achieve national development and national welfare.
The Taliban government’s behavior also shows that in the past three years, their leaders have focused more on the process of establishing the government and maintaining the security of the entire geography of Afghanistan, and less progress has been made in creating the structures and mechanisms necessary for a national government. In this regard, there are two types of interpretations: positive and negative.
In the positive interpretation, the Taliban leaders will probably advance the path of forming a national government step by step and gradually. It is based on this view that even after three years, the Taliban leaders still refer to their government as caretaker and temporary, and there is a hope that the Taliban government will seek to create a permanent structure with more inclusive indicators.
In a negative view, it is likely that the Taliban government - based on the traditional and customary view of politics - considers the current structures and mechanisms of its government as fixed elements, and seeks to strengthen its current model and structure of government, without making the reforms desired by the international community.
The second approach: fulfilling expectations and requirements
Based on this approach, every government has to adapt itself to its surrounding environment requirements and respond to basic expectations, in order to be able to survive and be effective. From this point of view, the Taliban government has faced basic domestic and international requirements and expectations from the beginning. Undoubtedly, failure to respond to these expectations will reduce the level of hope for the functioning of the Taliban government, and the potential of the Taliban in the direction of good governance will face serious damages and doubts.
According to this approach, a 3-year period is an enough time for a government to implement some major strategic plans, and to develop governance in the internal and external relations.
In this three-year period, the Taliban has made significant achievements in establishing and controlling the geography of Afghanistan. Despite this, the main question is whether the group has been able to take fundamental and sustainable steps in this three-year period, in line with the basic requirements of governance, and the basic expectations of the Afghans and the international community. In this report, we will answer this question.
Section one: the political situation of the Taliban government
Political studies and the experiences of governments shows that every newly established government must determine how to face three objective realities. These three facts are:
the structure of political power;
the type of political relations with the people; and
the type of political relations with the international system.
the type of political relations with the people; and
the type of political relations with the international system.
How a newly established government deals with these three influential facts has serious and vital effects on its functioning and survival.
The expectations and opportunities of the past three years required the Taliban to establish its political power on the basis of a comprehensive legal structure. Some experts believe that the title "Islamic Emirate" is not a comprehensive title for the ruling political structure in Afghanistan. Because the Islamic Emirate and the white flag of the Taliban government are not a national symbol and sign, and are not based on a national agreement. The Islamic Emirate and the white flag are the symbol of one of the jihadist and military groups in Afghanistan, which called the "Taliban".
In the 1990s, no ruling jihadist group - including Burhanuddin Rabbani's government - used their party's flag and symbol as a flag and symbol of national power and sovereignty. The flag of the communist parties also did not take the place of the national flag which was accepted and respected by the Afghan people.
Based on the bitter political experiences of the last fifty years of Afghanistan, it was expected that the Taliban would establish a national structure for its political governance in the last three years, and would strengthen that structure with a collective agreement. However, the Taliban's performance in this area has not been according to the requirements of a good governance. The Taliban has not even been able or want to hold a national dialogue about the type of the Afghanistan's future political system, with the aim of maintaining the country's political stability.
Undoubtedly, the way people look at a political system, as well as their position in it, has a very serious effect on the "survival and functioning" of that system. The experience of the past years in Afghanistan also shows that the type of ruling power relation with the people and social and religious groups has an effect on the level of people's support or hatred to the ruling power.
In the last three years, the Taliban had enough time to examine how people and social and religious groups can participate in the ruling power structure. Raising this issue is of vital importance, because the root of the half-century crisis of political power in Afghanistan goes back to the issue of power distribution in the country. Afghanistan is an ethnically and religiously diverse country, and any social group that, for any reason, is denied or excluded from the sphere of power distribution, has the potential to threaten the ruling system. Therefore, the current performance of the Taliban in facing the issue of rational and fair distribution of political power (with the aim of the participation of religious and ethnic groups in the political governance of Afghanistan) is not considered to be very effective.
The next issue is how the Taliban government faces and relates to the international system, which is a basic necessity. The experience of the Taliban's three-year rule showed that the type of political structure of the government, the way of people's participation and the type of official relationship between the international system and the Taliban are related to each other. Therefore, without the establishment of an inclusive political structure - with the fair participation of Afghan social and religious groups - the international community will not enter into a formal and stable relationship with the current Taliban government. The fact is that the type of the de facto relationship between the Taliban and other countries is no guarantee for establishing a stable relationship, based on international legal requirements, between them. This type of relation is inherently fragile, and is a big obstacle to making commitments, or realizing the long-term common interests of Afghanistan and other countries. The performance of the Taliban in this field is not very effective.
Despite this, the Taliban government performance in the last three years in the political arena has two major achievements: (1) the establishment of governance throughout all geography of Afghanistan, and (2) the absence of intra-organizational differences within the group.
The evidence shows that after nearly half a century crisis in Afghanistan, it is the first time that the government based in Kabul has complete its control over the entire geographical territory of Afghanistan. Also, contrary to all predictions, the different factions of the Taliban have maintained their internal unity well. Maintaining intra-organizational unity is not only a big achievement for the Taliban, but also is the most important guarantee for maintaining the political power of it.
Section two: the military-security status of the Taliban government
The dispersed military forces of the Taliban could easily destroy the army and the armed forces of the previous Afghan government. This military achievement has greatly increased the self-confidence of the Taliban forces. The Taliban's military victory in the battlefield was the result of the Taliban's special war strategy. The Taliban leaders had given full authority to their military commanders in different provinces. This full authority enabled the Taliban commanders to make timely decisions and tactics in the war against the Kabul government.
Now, however, the combat and guerrilla forces of the Taliban do not have that past status, and turn into a military-security entity. The security institutions of the Taliban now have special facilities and financial budget. This situation has created expectations, especially among the Taliban fighters. If their expectations are not met, or the policies of the Taliban government are not in accordance with their ideals, it is likely that the middle body of the Taliban combat forces will suffer from mental and psychological disturbances.
Despite this possibility, in the past three years, no serious tension has been observed between the security forces of the Taliban and the political structure of the government, because there has been no serious confrontation and competition between the political and military leaders of the Taliban. Current political leaders of the Taliban government are the former military and security leaders of the group. Therefore, for some time, there may not be any serious competition between the military and political parts of the Taliban.
Given this intra-organizational alliance, and with the help of the equipment left over from the armed forces of the former government, the army, police and the intelligence organization of the Taliban have been able to maintain their dominance over the geography of Afghanistan during these three years.
Despite all the initial predictions, the Islamic State of Khorasan Province group (ISKP) and the military opponents of the Taliban have not made any progress in controlling territory in Afghanistan in the last three years. Considering the evidence and the level of activity of the ISKP and other armed opponents of the Taliban, it can be concluded that none of their activities have had any significant results, except to show their survival.
This situation has caused the political opponents of the Taliban to emphasize more on intra-Afghan negotiations with the Taliban government. This approach indicates the strength and military-security capability of the Taliban, and the weakness of its armed opposition in the battlefield - which is considered a major achievement for the military and security sector of the Taliban.
Section three: the intellectual-cultural status
Under the Taliban regime, cultural factors such as girls' education, women's employment, the activities of the media and civil institutions, the status of the Persian language and basic religious rights, have faced relative turmoil more than other factors.
Regarding the Persian language, it should be said that despite all the challenges, the Taliban government has not opposed or taken any practical action against the Persian language at the leadership level. Overall, in the last three years, there has been no significant action against the Persian language in Afghanistan, except for some biased behaviors at the lower levels of the Taliban. Despite this, due to factors such as the stagnation of the book and publishing market, the closure of the free press and the introduction of Pashto as the official language of Afghanistan, the Persian language has indirectly faced serious problems in the country.
Also, despite the expectations, there has been no change in the Taliban's approach regarding the basic rights of Afghan Shiites and women during the past three years. This is despite the fact that before the fall of the former Afghan government, the leaders and countries supporting the Taliban were talking about the Taliban's change of mind, and with this approach, they divided the Taliban into two versions: Taliban 1 and 2.
With the resurgence of the Taliban rule, the legal-religious status of Shiites also faced limitations. The Shia Personal Status Law was removed from Afghan courts, and the teaching of Jafari jurisprudence was banned in all Afghan universities. These types of restrictions, along with their mental and psychological aspects, have harmed the position of Shiites in Afghanistan.
Regarding women, it should be said that the exclusion of girls from education and the prohibition of women from teaching in universities can never be considered as only a three-year restriction. According to experts, three years of educational deprivation for girls should be measured based on the scale of a lifetime. In addition, this situation has psychologically disturbed the minds and spirits of all Afghan families. This social despair and uncertainty about the future can endanger the psychological state of the entire society.
Despite domestic and international demands during the past three years, the Taliban has not revised its approach towards women and girls’ right to education and work, as well as the basic rights and freedoms of citizens and followers of different religions.
Ambiguity in the policies of the Taliban, and its resistance to the demands and fundamental rights of the Afghan people, shows that the Taliban has failed in the intellectual and cultural arena in the last three years. Realistic studies show that this type of cultural and educational policies of the Taliban has clearly caused the dissatisfaction of the Afghan people. In the long run, if the Taliban fails to respond to the needs and expectations of the Afghan people in the cultural and educational fields, it will provoke the hidden anger of the Afghan people.
Section 4: the economic status of the Taliban government
Many analyzes and reports about the economic situation of the Taliban government are general and misleading. Therefore, it is necessary to have a realistic view of Afghanistan's weaknesses, achievements and economic situation.
The evidence shows that the Taliban government has performed much better than the former Afghan government in terms of collecting public taxes and customs revenues. The Taliban government has made good progress in preventing corruption in the process of collecting public revenues. The Taliban government has earned huge revenues through large mining contracts as well as coal sales. This type of income constitutes a very large amount of the Taliban's budget. Under the former Afghan government, however, almost all funding was dependent on foreign aid.
Despite this achievement, the biggest problem in the financial system of the Taliban government is the lack of transparency in financial circulation and national revenues. The Taliban government is still far from the governance style of open states, and the media also do not have access to the administrative and financial information of the government.
In 2023, the Taliban government won large mining contracts in the fields of oil, iron, copper, gold and other valuable metals. In 2024, however, it did not have a large mining contract, and the only promising news was the start of mining in the Aynak copper mine in Afghanistan by a Chinese company, whose contract was signed with the former Afghan government.
The income from extracting and selling minerals and coal, as well as receiving weekly cash shipments, have saturated the Afghan market with foreign currency. This situation has caused the stability of the value of Afghani in the past year. Stabilizing Afghani is considered as a macroeconomic achievement for the Taliban government. Although during this period, we have witnessed the stability of Afghani as well as the increase of exports and imports, but the high unemployment rate and the increase of inflation in consumer goods are still worrying. In the past year, only the prices of flour and oil have remained affordable in Afghanistan, after an exponential increase during the first two years of the Taliban rule.
The evidence shows that the Taliban's performance in the construction of medium-sized dams, road construction and urban development has been significant. Currently, important urban projects, including the development of streets in deprived and marginal areas of Kabul city, are being carried out. In the past years, the non-expert urban development and the establishment of non-engineered settlements had greatly disturbed the face of Kabul city. In addition, it was almost impossible or difficult to provide any kind of urban service in these areas, due to the lack of large and standard roads. This year, however, the Taliban government has seriously undertaken street widening projects in these areas, which is considered as a huge and unprecedented achievement for the government.
The Taliban's efforts to strengthen the economy-oriented foreign policy, and to integrate into the regional economy and transit network are theoretically commendable, but so far no practical action has been taken to implement projects such as the CASA -1000 (Central Asia-SouthAsia power project), TAPI (Turkmenistan– Afghanistan – Pakistan – India gas pipeline), TUTAP (Turkmenistan– Uzbekistan – Tajikistan – Afghanistan – Pakistan power project), and Trans-Afghan railway inside Afghanistan. The construction of the Wakhan transit road towards the Chinese border, and the work on the last section of the Khaf-Herat railway line are among the major achievements of the Taliban government in the regional transit sector. Despite this, the Taliban has not been able to resolve its transit challenges with the Pakistani government, and for example, the Torkham border crossing which is one of the most important trade ports between Afghanistan and Pakistan is frequently closed.
It should be noted that the purpose of mentioning these examples is to have a real look at the economic developments of the Taliban government, and presenting a comprehensive statistical report of all economic events in Afghanistan is beyond the scope of this article.
Along with all the economic developments in Afghanistan, the implementation of the policy of banning opium production in Afghanistan is one of the unique successes of the Taliban government. Official reports confirm that drug production and trafficking statistics are experiencing an unprecedented decline under the Taliban regime.
Section 5: relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran
In the last three years, the Taliban has tried to keep Afghanistan away from the center of regional tensions, and the competition of great powers. Despite this, the Taliban government has adopted the most explicit positions in supporting Palestine, and condemning the inhuman acts of the Zionist regime in Palestine. Meanwhile, the Israeli regime is a political ally of the United States, and the Taliban government is trying to return its political relations with the U.S government to a normal and diplomatic state.
Undoubtedly, the explicit policy of the Taliban government towards the Palestin-Israel conflict has created a kind of political and Islamic alignment between Iran and Afghanistan, which seems almost unprecedented in the historical relations between the two countries.
On the other hand, the Iranian government has also taken effective efforts at the regional level, in order to form a regional process to solve the current crisis in Afghanistan and create stability in the country. Iran's efforts and position in the regional process of the Moscow format, and the formation of the Regional Contact Group shows the Tehran's good neighborhood policy. It also gives priority to Afghanistan in the region, and provides the basis for Afghanistan's integration into the regional order.
In the security sector, the mutual engagement between Iran and the Taliban has been measured so far, and has been in accordance with the requirements and expectations. Despite the initial predictions in the first year of the Taliban rule, issues such as border challenges, drug smuggling and transit, and the presence of terrorist groups on the Iran - Afghanistan border have been largely controlled.
In the last three years, Iran has reached the first place in Afghanistan's trade balance, Iranian food products have been the main part of the food basket of Afghan households, and Iranian raw materials have also had a significant amount and demand in the Afghan market.
Despite the positive and effective economic, diplomatic and security interaction between the Taliban and Iran in the last three years, the factors of possible tensions between the two countries have not been completely eliminated.
In addition, the foreign policy of Taliban government in the arena of competition between Iran and the Great Powers has not yet been determined. For example, if the United States one day puts a big incentive package on the table of the Taliban that Iran will not or cannot offer, will the Taliban really prefer maintaining Good Neighbor Policy with Iran over establishing strategic relations with the United States or not? The answer to this question is not yet clear.
Another fact is that the Taliban is continuing the water policy of the previous Afghan governments, and is seriously implementing water control plans and dam construction projects in Harirud and Helmand rivers. In addition, the hypothesis that the Taliban, like the previous Afghan governments, uses water as a tool in their foreign policy, does not seem completely ruled out. This situation raises serious doubts about the prospects of foreign relations between Iran and the Taliban. Undoubtedly, curbing these potential tensions requires strategic policies and deterrent tools that will be determined over time, based on the Great Games in the region and beyond.
conclusion
Undoubtedly, the defeat of the United States and NATO in Afghanistan and the victory of the Taliban have been one of the biggest events in the region in recent years. The psychological feedback of the Taliban's victory has been so extensive that it has overshadowed other developments, including the performance of the Taliban government. The Taliban leaders also talk more about the nature of their victory over the military power of NATO and U.S rather than explaining their governance style, and consider this victory as the greatest achievement of their group.
Meanwhile, the evidence shows that the Taliban government has made significant progress in the security and economic sectors in these three years. However, it has not made any effective achievements in system- building and state-nation building, as well as the intellectual-cultural area.
The behavior of the Taliban in this three- year period clearly shows their worldview and their way of governance. It seems that Taliban theoreticians consider a centralized and authoritarian religious governance as the most suitable governance system for Afghanistan. With this in mind, the future approach of the Taliban towards the basic rights of ethnic and religious groups as well as Afghan women still seems unclear. Despite this, the Taliban's serious efforts in the security sector, as well as the implementation of macro-economic plans through a state-oriented system, have created relative hopes in the minds of the Afghan people.
Although the Taliban has established its undisputed rule over the entire territory of Afghanistan, one issue should be noted: Afghanistan is the land of unexpected changes, and all Afghan governments have experienced unfinished chapters in the last half century. The undeniable facts of Afghanistan's social structure show that the Taliban government is also built on the country's hidden social faults. So, if the Taliban leaders do not learn from the bitter experiences of the past, this country may once again face great political-security challenges.
Waliullah Moradian, is an Afghan expert.
The expectations and opportunities of the past three years required the Taliban to establish its political power on the basis of a comprehensive legal structure. Some experts believe that the title "Islamic Emirate" is not a comprehensive title for the ruling political structure in Afghanistan. Because the Islamic Emirate and the white flag of the Taliban government are not a national symbol and sign, and are not based on a national agreement. The Islamic Emirate and the white flag are the symbol of one of the jihadist and military groups in Afghanistan, which called the "Taliban".
In the 1990s, no ruling jihadist group - including Burhanuddin Rabbani's government - used their party's flag and symbol as a flag and symbol of national power and sovereignty. The flag of the communist parties also did not take the place of the national flag which was accepted and respected by the Afghan people.
Based on the bitter political experiences of the last fifty years of Afghanistan, it was expected that the Taliban would establish a national structure for its political governance in the last three years, and would strengthen that structure with a collective agreement. However, the Taliban's performance in this area has not been according to the requirements of a good governance. The Taliban has not even been able or want to hold a national dialogue about the type of the Afghanistan's future political system, with the aim of maintaining the country's political stability.
Undoubtedly, the way people look at a political system, as well as their position in it, has a very serious effect on the "survival and functioning" of that system. The experience of the past years in Afghanistan also shows that the type of ruling power relation with the people and social and religious groups has an effect on the level of people's support or hatred to the ruling power.
In the last three years, the Taliban had enough time to examine how people and social and religious groups can participate in the ruling power structure. Raising this issue is of vital importance, because the root of the half-century crisis of political power in Afghanistan goes back to the issue of power distribution in the country. Afghanistan is an ethnically and religiously diverse country, and any social group that, for any reason, is denied or excluded from the sphere of power distribution, has the potential to threaten the ruling system. Therefore, the current performance of the Taliban in facing the issue of rational and fair distribution of political power (with the aim of the participation of religious and ethnic groups in the political governance of Afghanistan) is not considered to be very effective.
The next issue is how the Taliban government faces and relates to the international system, which is a basic necessity. The experience of the Taliban's three-year rule showed that the type of political structure of the government, the way of people's participation and the type of official relationship between the international system and the Taliban are related to each other. Therefore, without the establishment of an inclusive political structure - with the fair participation of Afghan social and religious groups - the international community will not enter into a formal and stable relationship with the current Taliban government. The fact is that the type of the de facto relationship between the Taliban and other countries is no guarantee for establishing a stable relationship, based on international legal requirements, between them. This type of relation is inherently fragile, and is a big obstacle to making commitments, or realizing the long-term common interests of Afghanistan and other countries. The performance of the Taliban in this field is not very effective.
Despite this, the Taliban government performance in the last three years in the political arena has two major achievements: (1) the establishment of governance throughout all geography of Afghanistan, and (2) the absence of intra-organizational differences within the group.
The evidence shows that after nearly half a century crisis in Afghanistan, it is the first time that the government based in Kabul has complete its control over the entire geographical territory of Afghanistan. Also, contrary to all predictions, the different factions of the Taliban have maintained their internal unity well. Maintaining intra-organizational unity is not only a big achievement for the Taliban, but also is the most important guarantee for maintaining the political power of it.
Section two: the military-security status of the Taliban government
The dispersed military forces of the Taliban could easily destroy the army and the armed forces of the previous Afghan government. This military achievement has greatly increased the self-confidence of the Taliban forces. The Taliban's military victory in the battlefield was the result of the Taliban's special war strategy. The Taliban leaders had given full authority to their military commanders in different provinces. This full authority enabled the Taliban commanders to make timely decisions and tactics in the war against the Kabul government.
Now, however, the combat and guerrilla forces of the Taliban do not have that past status, and turn into a military-security entity. The security institutions of the Taliban now have special facilities and financial budget. This situation has created expectations, especially among the Taliban fighters. If their expectations are not met, or the policies of the Taliban government are not in accordance with their ideals, it is likely that the middle body of the Taliban combat forces will suffer from mental and psychological disturbances.
Despite this possibility, in the past three years, no serious tension has been observed between the security forces of the Taliban and the political structure of the government, because there has been no serious confrontation and competition between the political and military leaders of the Taliban. Current political leaders of the Taliban government are the former military and security leaders of the group. Therefore, for some time, there may not be any serious competition between the military and political parts of the Taliban.
Given this intra-organizational alliance, and with the help of the equipment left over from the armed forces of the former government, the army, police and the intelligence organization of the Taliban have been able to maintain their dominance over the geography of Afghanistan during these three years.
Despite all the initial predictions, the Islamic State of Khorasan Province group (ISKP) and the military opponents of the Taliban have not made any progress in controlling territory in Afghanistan in the last three years. Considering the evidence and the level of activity of the ISKP and other armed opponents of the Taliban, it can be concluded that none of their activities have had any significant results, except to show their survival.
This situation has caused the political opponents of the Taliban to emphasize more on intra-Afghan negotiations with the Taliban government. This approach indicates the strength and military-security capability of the Taliban, and the weakness of its armed opposition in the battlefield - which is considered a major achievement for the military and security sector of the Taliban.
Section three: the intellectual-cultural status
Under the Taliban regime, cultural factors such as girls' education, women's employment, the activities of the media and civil institutions, the status of the Persian language and basic religious rights, have faced relative turmoil more than other factors.
Regarding the Persian language, it should be said that despite all the challenges, the Taliban government has not opposed or taken any practical action against the Persian language at the leadership level. Overall, in the last three years, there has been no significant action against the Persian language in Afghanistan, except for some biased behaviors at the lower levels of the Taliban. Despite this, due to factors such as the stagnation of the book and publishing market, the closure of the free press and the introduction of Pashto as the official language of Afghanistan, the Persian language has indirectly faced serious problems in the country.
Also, despite the expectations, there has been no change in the Taliban's approach regarding the basic rights of Afghan Shiites and women during the past three years. This is despite the fact that before the fall of the former Afghan government, the leaders and countries supporting the Taliban were talking about the Taliban's change of mind, and with this approach, they divided the Taliban into two versions: Taliban 1 and 2.
With the resurgence of the Taliban rule, the legal-religious status of Shiites also faced limitations. The Shia Personal Status Law was removed from Afghan courts, and the teaching of Jafari jurisprudence was banned in all Afghan universities. These types of restrictions, along with their mental and psychological aspects, have harmed the position of Shiites in Afghanistan.
Regarding women, it should be said that the exclusion of girls from education and the prohibition of women from teaching in universities can never be considered as only a three-year restriction. According to experts, three years of educational deprivation for girls should be measured based on the scale of a lifetime. In addition, this situation has psychologically disturbed the minds and spirits of all Afghan families. This social despair and uncertainty about the future can endanger the psychological state of the entire society.
Despite domestic and international demands during the past three years, the Taliban has not revised its approach towards women and girls’ right to education and work, as well as the basic rights and freedoms of citizens and followers of different religions.
Ambiguity in the policies of the Taliban, and its resistance to the demands and fundamental rights of the Afghan people, shows that the Taliban has failed in the intellectual and cultural arena in the last three years. Realistic studies show that this type of cultural and educational policies of the Taliban has clearly caused the dissatisfaction of the Afghan people. In the long run, if the Taliban fails to respond to the needs and expectations of the Afghan people in the cultural and educational fields, it will provoke the hidden anger of the Afghan people.
Section 4: the economic status of the Taliban government
Many analyzes and reports about the economic situation of the Taliban government are general and misleading. Therefore, it is necessary to have a realistic view of Afghanistan's weaknesses, achievements and economic situation.
The evidence shows that the Taliban government has performed much better than the former Afghan government in terms of collecting public taxes and customs revenues. The Taliban government has made good progress in preventing corruption in the process of collecting public revenues. The Taliban government has earned huge revenues through large mining contracts as well as coal sales. This type of income constitutes a very large amount of the Taliban's budget. Under the former Afghan government, however, almost all funding was dependent on foreign aid.
Despite this achievement, the biggest problem in the financial system of the Taliban government is the lack of transparency in financial circulation and national revenues. The Taliban government is still far from the governance style of open states, and the media also do not have access to the administrative and financial information of the government.
In 2023, the Taliban government won large mining contracts in the fields of oil, iron, copper, gold and other valuable metals. In 2024, however, it did not have a large mining contract, and the only promising news was the start of mining in the Aynak copper mine in Afghanistan by a Chinese company, whose contract was signed with the former Afghan government.
The income from extracting and selling minerals and coal, as well as receiving weekly cash shipments, have saturated the Afghan market with foreign currency. This situation has caused the stability of the value of Afghani in the past year. Stabilizing Afghani is considered as a macroeconomic achievement for the Taliban government. Although during this period, we have witnessed the stability of Afghani as well as the increase of exports and imports, but the high unemployment rate and the increase of inflation in consumer goods are still worrying. In the past year, only the prices of flour and oil have remained affordable in Afghanistan, after an exponential increase during the first two years of the Taliban rule.
The evidence shows that the Taliban's performance in the construction of medium-sized dams, road construction and urban development has been significant. Currently, important urban projects, including the development of streets in deprived and marginal areas of Kabul city, are being carried out. In the past years, the non-expert urban development and the establishment of non-engineered settlements had greatly disturbed the face of Kabul city. In addition, it was almost impossible or difficult to provide any kind of urban service in these areas, due to the lack of large and standard roads. This year, however, the Taliban government has seriously undertaken street widening projects in these areas, which is considered as a huge and unprecedented achievement for the government.
The Taliban's efforts to strengthen the economy-oriented foreign policy, and to integrate into the regional economy and transit network are theoretically commendable, but so far no practical action has been taken to implement projects such as the CASA -1000 (Central Asia-SouthAsia power project), TAPI (Turkmenistan– Afghanistan – Pakistan – India gas pipeline), TUTAP (Turkmenistan– Uzbekistan – Tajikistan – Afghanistan – Pakistan power project), and Trans-Afghan railway inside Afghanistan. The construction of the Wakhan transit road towards the Chinese border, and the work on the last section of the Khaf-Herat railway line are among the major achievements of the Taliban government in the regional transit sector. Despite this, the Taliban has not been able to resolve its transit challenges with the Pakistani government, and for example, the Torkham border crossing which is one of the most important trade ports between Afghanistan and Pakistan is frequently closed.
It should be noted that the purpose of mentioning these examples is to have a real look at the economic developments of the Taliban government, and presenting a comprehensive statistical report of all economic events in Afghanistan is beyond the scope of this article.
Along with all the economic developments in Afghanistan, the implementation of the policy of banning opium production in Afghanistan is one of the unique successes of the Taliban government. Official reports confirm that drug production and trafficking statistics are experiencing an unprecedented decline under the Taliban regime.
Section 5: relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran
In the last three years, the Taliban has tried to keep Afghanistan away from the center of regional tensions, and the competition of great powers. Despite this, the Taliban government has adopted the most explicit positions in supporting Palestine, and condemning the inhuman acts of the Zionist regime in Palestine. Meanwhile, the Israeli regime is a political ally of the United States, and the Taliban government is trying to return its political relations with the U.S government to a normal and diplomatic state.
Undoubtedly, the explicit policy of the Taliban government towards the Palestin-Israel conflict has created a kind of political and Islamic alignment between Iran and Afghanistan, which seems almost unprecedented in the historical relations between the two countries.
On the other hand, the Iranian government has also taken effective efforts at the regional level, in order to form a regional process to solve the current crisis in Afghanistan and create stability in the country. Iran's efforts and position in the regional process of the Moscow format, and the formation of the Regional Contact Group shows the Tehran's good neighborhood policy. It also gives priority to Afghanistan in the region, and provides the basis for Afghanistan's integration into the regional order.
In the security sector, the mutual engagement between Iran and the Taliban has been measured so far, and has been in accordance with the requirements and expectations. Despite the initial predictions in the first year of the Taliban rule, issues such as border challenges, drug smuggling and transit, and the presence of terrorist groups on the Iran - Afghanistan border have been largely controlled.
In the last three years, Iran has reached the first place in Afghanistan's trade balance, Iranian food products have been the main part of the food basket of Afghan households, and Iranian raw materials have also had a significant amount and demand in the Afghan market.
Despite the positive and effective economic, diplomatic and security interaction between the Taliban and Iran in the last three years, the factors of possible tensions between the two countries have not been completely eliminated.
In addition, the foreign policy of Taliban government in the arena of competition between Iran and the Great Powers has not yet been determined. For example, if the United States one day puts a big incentive package on the table of the Taliban that Iran will not or cannot offer, will the Taliban really prefer maintaining Good Neighbor Policy with Iran over establishing strategic relations with the United States or not? The answer to this question is not yet clear.
Another fact is that the Taliban is continuing the water policy of the previous Afghan governments, and is seriously implementing water control plans and dam construction projects in Harirud and Helmand rivers. In addition, the hypothesis that the Taliban, like the previous Afghan governments, uses water as a tool in their foreign policy, does not seem completely ruled out. This situation raises serious doubts about the prospects of foreign relations between Iran and the Taliban. Undoubtedly, curbing these potential tensions requires strategic policies and deterrent tools that will be determined over time, based on the Great Games in the region and beyond.
conclusion
Undoubtedly, the defeat of the United States and NATO in Afghanistan and the victory of the Taliban have been one of the biggest events in the region in recent years. The psychological feedback of the Taliban's victory has been so extensive that it has overshadowed other developments, including the performance of the Taliban government. The Taliban leaders also talk more about the nature of their victory over the military power of NATO and U.S rather than explaining their governance style, and consider this victory as the greatest achievement of their group.
Meanwhile, the evidence shows that the Taliban government has made significant progress in the security and economic sectors in these three years. However, it has not made any effective achievements in system- building and state-nation building, as well as the intellectual-cultural area.
The behavior of the Taliban in this three- year period clearly shows their worldview and their way of governance. It seems that Taliban theoreticians consider a centralized and authoritarian religious governance as the most suitable governance system for Afghanistan. With this in mind, the future approach of the Taliban towards the basic rights of ethnic and religious groups as well as Afghan women still seems unclear. Despite this, the Taliban's serious efforts in the security sector, as well as the implementation of macro-economic plans through a state-oriented system, have created relative hopes in the minds of the Afghan people.
Although the Taliban has established its undisputed rule over the entire territory of Afghanistan, one issue should be noted: Afghanistan is the land of unexpected changes, and all Afghan governments have experienced unfinished chapters in the last half century. The undeniable facts of Afghanistan's social structure show that the Taliban government is also built on the country's hidden social faults. So, if the Taliban leaders do not learn from the bitter experiences of the past, this country may once again face great political-security challenges.
Waliullah Moradian, is an Afghan expert.
News code:3858
