3 Dec 2024
Publish Date
Wednesday 17 January 2024 - 13:34
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New Overlapping Security Trends in Central Asia
The fact is that before this, Russia and in some limited cases, China, were the main suppliers of weapons and defense equipment to Central Asian countries. Other suppliers, if any, were present in non-strategic areas. Now it seems that the balance of these areas is on the verge of change, with the acting of Turkey and Iran in the drone area, the arrival of new warships in the Caspian Sea, or the recent proposals of France to sell Rafale fighters or Master Grand 400 air defense radar.
By: Omid Rahimi
Introduction
During the last year, the security situation in Central Asia has been very sensitive. During this period, new security components and variables have emerged in the region, or traditional actors have changed the type of their security acting. This has created new overlapping trends in the security structure of the region. Of course, these trends already existed, but they have been reproduced in the form of new movements, or have emerged with greater intensity. The output of interference, conflict and interaction of these trends, at different levels, will shape the security dynamism of the Central Asia region, in which the interests of different actors will be able to be realized. In this sense, identifying these trends along with estimating their future directions and outputs can greatly help in determining strategic interests in Central Asia, and ensuring their realization in the future.
Overlapping trends
During the last year, five overlapping trends have emerged in the security field of Central Asia, the most important of which are briefly mentioned here. It is obvious that these trends all have other complements and alternatives, but here they are referred to as the main trends simply because of their different roles.
1. The emergence of new players in the military and defense arena, with the ability to change the balance:
This process is a complementary part of a process that can be considered as "the emergence of new non-Russian trends in the Central Asian arms sector". The fact is that before this, Russia and in some limited cases, China, were the main suppliers of weapons and defense equipment to Central Asian countries. Other actors, if any, were present in non-strategic areas. In fact, the presence of other actors took place in areas and levels that did not disturb the regional balance which was in favor of Russia and China. Therefore, the countries of Central Asia went to other actors only diversify their weapons, fill existing gaps, receive foreign aid, and try to localize some equipment.
Already, the supply of some armored vehicles, artillery equipment, personal equipment, combat reconnaissance and intelligence equipment, spare parts for armored vehicles, etc. was among the most important military purchases of Central Asian countries. Now it seems that the balance of these areas is on the verge of change, with the acting of Turkey and Iran in the field of drones, the arrival of new warships in the Caspian Sea, or the recent proposals of France to sell Rafale fighters or MGrand 400 air defense radar.
At the same time, there is some speculation that the United States will hand over to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan the Afghan planes and helicopters that fled to the two countries after the Taliban came to power. The realization of this will play a significant role in strengthening the air forces of these countries. It should be mentioned that Tajikistan has recently handed over the control of all 18 airports in the border areas to the Ministry of Defense.
2. A decrease in the role of CSTO, and an increase in the independence of countries:
Another trend that has been clearly felt during the last year has been the increase in divergent trends in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and on the contrary, the strengthening of local defense capabilities of the countries in the region. A key factor is Moscow's involvement in the Ukraine war, and the increased costs of military and defense engagement with Russia. This issue has led Central Asian countries to strengthen their internal military capabilities and increase their defense budgets. In Kyrgyzstan, for the first time, we have seen the purchase of weapons from foreign suppliers, and in Kazakhstan, we have also seen a 6% increase in the defense budget in the new year, reaching 1.5 billion dollars.
In military exercises, we have also seen an increase in the number of independent exercises, and the emergence of tension in CSTO’s exercises. Last year, Indestructible Brotherhood exercise was held unscheduled in Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan did not participate in it. This year, however, it was hosted by Kyrgyzstan but this time Armenia was not present. Speculations about Kazakhstan's withdrawal from this organization have increased to such an extent that the Ministry of Defense of this country has denied it twice. Kyrgyzstan recently held one of its most important exercises in the tactical field with the presence of a newly established drone unit independently, and Turkmenistan continues to hold larger exercises than in the past.
Despite the harsh criticism of Russian officials, the agreements of these countries with Turkey, as a member of NATO, are still ongoing. This problem is so great that even with the approval of 20 documents at the recent CSTO meeting in Minsk, there is practically no hope for its progress. The most important achievement of this organization during the last year has been the agreement with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to form an integrated defense network.
3. Growing threats from Afghanistan:
The withdrawal of US military forces and the international coalition from Afghanistan was without the knowledge of Central Asian countries, and of course, without considering the concerns of these countries. While the countries of the region and the former government of Afghanistan were building a strategic partnership to connect Central Asia to South Asia, the withdrawal of the U.S led to the collapse of the Afghan government, and the rise of the Taliban as an unpredictable and highly uncertain actor.
Now, after two years of this event, the Taliban regime is still not recognized as a government, and this itself is considered as a big obstacle for the countries of Central Asia. At the same time, the controversial decisions of the Taliban, such as the ban on poppy cultivation, as well as ambitious plans such as the Qosh Tepa Canal, along with the unpredictability of this group's behavior in possible tensions, have prevented any kind of countermeasures by the Central Asian countries.
On the other hand, despite the extensive security and defense capabilities of the Taliban, there are still many doubts about the ability of Emirate to control various groups (especially groups with foreign support). Meanwhile, increasing polarization in the structure of the international system, and the possibility of Afghanistan and even Central Asia becoming an arena for proxy battles between the West and Russia and China have added to these concerns.
Last month, the head of the Federal Security Service of Russia openly announced that the Americans are trying to create an insecurity belt on Russia's southern borders. The Chief of CSTO Joint Staff also recently emphasized the threats caused by the lack of proper control of the border areas in Afghanistan. This situation has caused the countries of the region to find similar behaviors, and find more convergence with all active actors in Afghanistan. But the recent behavior of the West in irresponsibly withdrawing from Afghanistan, and at the same time, the possible consequences of getting closer to Russia and China, have pushed the Central Asian countries to play an independent and operational role in Afghanistan.
4. Increase in security and intelligence partnerships and competitions:
The security and intelligence situation in Central Asian countries has become very sensitive. In Uzbekistan, during the process of power transfer, Rostam Inoyatov, the most important security figure of this country, was dismissed. A revolution took place in Kyrgyzstan when Sadyr Japarov came to power, and a revolutionary figure like Kamchybek Tashiev with a controversial record was placed at the head of the security service. In Tajikistan, Rahmon eliminated all opposition forces in a major security and intelligence game, and faced a huge challenge in Badakhshan. In Kazakhstan, a quasi-coup (according to the government) led by Karim Massimov, the country's number one security man, took place and changed the conditions for the formation of the new government. Only Turkmenistan has had some kind of relative stability in its security and intelligence area.
In such a context where almost new security services have come to power in all the countries of the region, security and intelligence partnerships are considered a tangible behavior. Meanwhile, these conditions are at a time when the tension between the West and Russia has reached its highest level since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the West is seriously and officially trying to increase its influence in Central Asia, and deepen the gap between these countries and Russia. Such a plan requires direct and coherent information-security activities. The issue of sanctions and Russia's attempts to circumvent them by using the countries of the region, along with the connection of this issue with oligarchic interests, has added to the sensitivities.
The last factor influencing this process is the Gaza war, and the emergence of radical reactions to the interests and presence of the Zionist regime in the region. This factor can further intensify security and intelligence partnerships and competitions. The inherent closed space of the countries of the region, along with relatively powerful security services, has created complex conditions in this regard.
5. The emergence of new nuclear actors in the region:
Already, we could only name Kazakhstan as a nuclear actor in Central Asia. In the 1990s, the country had some nuclear infrastructure of the former Soviet Union, which was gradually closed or transferred to Russia. However, now after two decades, the nuclear situation in the region seems to be on the verge of a change. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, as the two regional powers of Central Asia, are about to become nuclear states. Both countries seem to have reached an initial agreement with Rosatom to build their first modern nuclear power plant. In Kyrgyzstan, a similar agreement has been reached with Rusatom for the construction of small nuclear reactors.
At the same time, the need for uranium in the world, especially after the Ukraine war and the developments in Africa, has changed in such a way that it has again promoted the role of Central Asian countries in nuclear area. As a result of this situation, uranium mining and nuclear fuel processing cycles are growing. This growth has been noticeable, especially in Uzbekistan. Countries such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which had previously banned uranium exports, will probably consider returning to uranium exports due to the rich revenues of this sector.
Thus, in Central Asia, we will face actors who are on the verge of nuclearization. Considering the above-mentioned four trends, this evolution will gain double importance.
Implications and future prospects
Each of the aforementioned trends can lead to different outputs separately:
The emergence of new players in the military and defense arena with the ability to change the balance: this trend, on the one hand, gradually weakens Russia's position in the region and can lead to an increase in tensions in the region, and on the other hand, by strengthening the military and defense infrastructure of The countries of the region, especially by covering Russia's weaknesses, can bring security to Central Asia. However, if these capacities are defined against Russia, they can create a scenario similar to Ukraine (under the influence of external stimuli) where instability will be one of its results.
The Reduction of CSTO role: Although this is not a definite and stable process, it can be bad news at least for small countries such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which basically do not have the possibility and ability to be independent in the military and defense fields. Weakening the foundations of this organization and focusing more on the areas of bilateral relations (in interaction with Russia) will make these countries more vulnerable, especially in the face of threats from Afghanistan or internal anti-security currents (such as extremism, terrorism or separatism). However, for larger countries in the region such as Kazakhstan, this trend can mean strengthening their independence and capability in the military field, while maintaining bilateral relations with Russia.
Emergence of growing threats from Afghanistan: Growing threats from Afghanistan, and indeed, uncertainty from Afghanistan, is the most important factor affecting the regional security of Central Asia. This factor affects the security of the region, both independently and in connection with other aforementioned trends. Afghanistan has somehow determined the security behaviors of southern countries in Central Asia (including Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan). At the regional level, also, Afghanistan has attracted the attention of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and has caused special concerns for Russia.
Increasing security and intelligence partnerships and competitions: This trend which has come to the fore in Central Asia due to the developments in Afghanistan, the Ukraine war, and even the recent war in Gaza, is more considered an anti-security factor rather than a security-creating one. Although the security services of these countries make a lot of effort to benefit from such competition and cooperation, but given the sensitivities and vulnerabilities, this process does not seem to bring special benefits to the countries of the region - In the same way as the multifaceted strategies in the foreign policy of these countries has never been completely successful, and their costs have exceeded its benefits. This trend can even lead to the fall and collapse of some security structures of regional services. This trend can even lead to the collapse of the structures of some security services in the region. In Kazakhstan, we witnessed such a process under the leadership of Karim Massimov.
Nuclearization of the countries of the region: At the functional level, this trend will have many advantages in providing energy for these countries, and at the political level, it is considered an important prestige for them. At the security level, however, it will involve the reproduction of dependence on Russia, and greater vulnerability to existing threats. During the January 2022 protests in Kazakhstan, we saw that the country's security and law enforcement structures did not have enough power to protect sensitive biological centers in this country. Basically, the CSTO’s Rapid Reaction Force entered this country with the aim of protecting these centers. Therefore, in general, the nuclearization of Central Asian countries will increase their security vulnerability.
Omid Rahimi, is the researcher of Institute of East Strategic Studies.
Introduction
During the last year, the security situation in Central Asia has been very sensitive. During this period, new security components and variables have emerged in the region, or traditional actors have changed the type of their security acting. This has created new overlapping trends in the security structure of the region. Of course, these trends already existed, but they have been reproduced in the form of new movements, or have emerged with greater intensity. The output of interference, conflict and interaction of these trends, at different levels, will shape the security dynamism of the Central Asia region, in which the interests of different actors will be able to be realized. In this sense, identifying these trends along with estimating their future directions and outputs can greatly help in determining strategic interests in Central Asia, and ensuring their realization in the future.
Overlapping trends
During the last year, five overlapping trends have emerged in the security field of Central Asia, the most important of which are briefly mentioned here. It is obvious that these trends all have other complements and alternatives, but here they are referred to as the main trends simply because of their different roles.
1. The emergence of new players in the military and defense arena, with the ability to change the balance:
This process is a complementary part of a process that can be considered as "the emergence of new non-Russian trends in the Central Asian arms sector". The fact is that before this, Russia and in some limited cases, China, were the main suppliers of weapons and defense equipment to Central Asian countries. Other actors, if any, were present in non-strategic areas. In fact, the presence of other actors took place in areas and levels that did not disturb the regional balance which was in favor of Russia and China. Therefore, the countries of Central Asia went to other actors only diversify their weapons, fill existing gaps, receive foreign aid, and try to localize some equipment.
Already, the supply of some armored vehicles, artillery equipment, personal equipment, combat reconnaissance and intelligence equipment, spare parts for armored vehicles, etc. was among the most important military purchases of Central Asian countries. Now it seems that the balance of these areas is on the verge of change, with the acting of Turkey and Iran in the field of drones, the arrival of new warships in the Caspian Sea, or the recent proposals of France to sell Rafale fighters or MGrand 400 air defense radar.
At the same time, there is some speculation that the United States will hand over to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan the Afghan planes and helicopters that fled to the two countries after the Taliban came to power. The realization of this will play a significant role in strengthening the air forces of these countries. It should be mentioned that Tajikistan has recently handed over the control of all 18 airports in the border areas to the Ministry of Defense.
2. A decrease in the role of CSTO, and an increase in the independence of countries:
Another trend that has been clearly felt during the last year has been the increase in divergent trends in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and on the contrary, the strengthening of local defense capabilities of the countries in the region. A key factor is Moscow's involvement in the Ukraine war, and the increased costs of military and defense engagement with Russia. This issue has led Central Asian countries to strengthen their internal military capabilities and increase their defense budgets. In Kyrgyzstan, for the first time, we have seen the purchase of weapons from foreign suppliers, and in Kazakhstan, we have also seen a 6% increase in the defense budget in the new year, reaching 1.5 billion dollars.
In military exercises, we have also seen an increase in the number of independent exercises, and the emergence of tension in CSTO’s exercises. Last year, Indestructible Brotherhood exercise was held unscheduled in Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan did not participate in it. This year, however, it was hosted by Kyrgyzstan but this time Armenia was not present. Speculations about Kazakhstan's withdrawal from this organization have increased to such an extent that the Ministry of Defense of this country has denied it twice. Kyrgyzstan recently held one of its most important exercises in the tactical field with the presence of a newly established drone unit independently, and Turkmenistan continues to hold larger exercises than in the past.
Despite the harsh criticism of Russian officials, the agreements of these countries with Turkey, as a member of NATO, are still ongoing. This problem is so great that even with the approval of 20 documents at the recent CSTO meeting in Minsk, there is practically no hope for its progress. The most important achievement of this organization during the last year has been the agreement with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to form an integrated defense network.
3. Growing threats from Afghanistan:
The withdrawal of US military forces and the international coalition from Afghanistan was without the knowledge of Central Asian countries, and of course, without considering the concerns of these countries. While the countries of the region and the former government of Afghanistan were building a strategic partnership to connect Central Asia to South Asia, the withdrawal of the U.S led to the collapse of the Afghan government, and the rise of the Taliban as an unpredictable and highly uncertain actor.
Now, after two years of this event, the Taliban regime is still not recognized as a government, and this itself is considered as a big obstacle for the countries of Central Asia. At the same time, the controversial decisions of the Taliban, such as the ban on poppy cultivation, as well as ambitious plans such as the Qosh Tepa Canal, along with the unpredictability of this group's behavior in possible tensions, have prevented any kind of countermeasures by the Central Asian countries.
On the other hand, despite the extensive security and defense capabilities of the Taliban, there are still many doubts about the ability of Emirate to control various groups (especially groups with foreign support). Meanwhile, increasing polarization in the structure of the international system, and the possibility of Afghanistan and even Central Asia becoming an arena for proxy battles between the West and Russia and China have added to these concerns.
Last month, the head of the Federal Security Service of Russia openly announced that the Americans are trying to create an insecurity belt on Russia's southern borders. The Chief of CSTO Joint Staff also recently emphasized the threats caused by the lack of proper control of the border areas in Afghanistan. This situation has caused the countries of the region to find similar behaviors, and find more convergence with all active actors in Afghanistan. But the recent behavior of the West in irresponsibly withdrawing from Afghanistan, and at the same time, the possible consequences of getting closer to Russia and China, have pushed the Central Asian countries to play an independent and operational role in Afghanistan.
4. Increase in security and intelligence partnerships and competitions:
The security and intelligence situation in Central Asian countries has become very sensitive. In Uzbekistan, during the process of power transfer, Rostam Inoyatov, the most important security figure of this country, was dismissed. A revolution took place in Kyrgyzstan when Sadyr Japarov came to power, and a revolutionary figure like Kamchybek Tashiev with a controversial record was placed at the head of the security service. In Tajikistan, Rahmon eliminated all opposition forces in a major security and intelligence game, and faced a huge challenge in Badakhshan. In Kazakhstan, a quasi-coup (according to the government) led by Karim Massimov, the country's number one security man, took place and changed the conditions for the formation of the new government. Only Turkmenistan has had some kind of relative stability in its security and intelligence area.
In such a context where almost new security services have come to power in all the countries of the region, security and intelligence partnerships are considered a tangible behavior. Meanwhile, these conditions are at a time when the tension between the West and Russia has reached its highest level since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the West is seriously and officially trying to increase its influence in Central Asia, and deepen the gap between these countries and Russia. Such a plan requires direct and coherent information-security activities. The issue of sanctions and Russia's attempts to circumvent them by using the countries of the region, along with the connection of this issue with oligarchic interests, has added to the sensitivities.
The last factor influencing this process is the Gaza war, and the emergence of radical reactions to the interests and presence of the Zionist regime in the region. This factor can further intensify security and intelligence partnerships and competitions. The inherent closed space of the countries of the region, along with relatively powerful security services, has created complex conditions in this regard.
5. The emergence of new nuclear actors in the region:
Already, we could only name Kazakhstan as a nuclear actor in Central Asia. In the 1990s, the country had some nuclear infrastructure of the former Soviet Union, which was gradually closed or transferred to Russia. However, now after two decades, the nuclear situation in the region seems to be on the verge of a change. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, as the two regional powers of Central Asia, are about to become nuclear states. Both countries seem to have reached an initial agreement with Rosatom to build their first modern nuclear power plant. In Kyrgyzstan, a similar agreement has been reached with Rusatom for the construction of small nuclear reactors.
At the same time, the need for uranium in the world, especially after the Ukraine war and the developments in Africa, has changed in such a way that it has again promoted the role of Central Asian countries in nuclear area. As a result of this situation, uranium mining and nuclear fuel processing cycles are growing. This growth has been noticeable, especially in Uzbekistan. Countries such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which had previously banned uranium exports, will probably consider returning to uranium exports due to the rich revenues of this sector.
Thus, in Central Asia, we will face actors who are on the verge of nuclearization. Considering the above-mentioned four trends, this evolution will gain double importance.
Implications and future prospects
Each of the aforementioned trends can lead to different outputs separately:
The emergence of new players in the military and defense arena with the ability to change the balance: this trend, on the one hand, gradually weakens Russia's position in the region and can lead to an increase in tensions in the region, and on the other hand, by strengthening the military and defense infrastructure of The countries of the region, especially by covering Russia's weaknesses, can bring security to Central Asia. However, if these capacities are defined against Russia, they can create a scenario similar to Ukraine (under the influence of external stimuli) where instability will be one of its results.
The Reduction of CSTO role: Although this is not a definite and stable process, it can be bad news at least for small countries such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which basically do not have the possibility and ability to be independent in the military and defense fields. Weakening the foundations of this organization and focusing more on the areas of bilateral relations (in interaction with Russia) will make these countries more vulnerable, especially in the face of threats from Afghanistan or internal anti-security currents (such as extremism, terrorism or separatism). However, for larger countries in the region such as Kazakhstan, this trend can mean strengthening their independence and capability in the military field, while maintaining bilateral relations with Russia.
Emergence of growing threats from Afghanistan: Growing threats from Afghanistan, and indeed, uncertainty from Afghanistan, is the most important factor affecting the regional security of Central Asia. This factor affects the security of the region, both independently and in connection with other aforementioned trends. Afghanistan has somehow determined the security behaviors of southern countries in Central Asia (including Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan). At the regional level, also, Afghanistan has attracted the attention of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and has caused special concerns for Russia.
Increasing security and intelligence partnerships and competitions: This trend which has come to the fore in Central Asia due to the developments in Afghanistan, the Ukraine war, and even the recent war in Gaza, is more considered an anti-security factor rather than a security-creating one. Although the security services of these countries make a lot of effort to benefit from such competition and cooperation, but given the sensitivities and vulnerabilities, this process does not seem to bring special benefits to the countries of the region - In the same way as the multifaceted strategies in the foreign policy of these countries has never been completely successful, and their costs have exceeded its benefits. This trend can even lead to the fall and collapse of some security structures of regional services. This trend can even lead to the collapse of the structures of some security services in the region. In Kazakhstan, we witnessed such a process under the leadership of Karim Massimov.
Nuclearization of the countries of the region: At the functional level, this trend will have many advantages in providing energy for these countries, and at the political level, it is considered an important prestige for them. At the security level, however, it will involve the reproduction of dependence on Russia, and greater vulnerability to existing threats. During the January 2022 protests in Kazakhstan, we saw that the country's security and law enforcement structures did not have enough power to protect sensitive biological centers in this country. Basically, the CSTO’s Rapid Reaction Force entered this country with the aim of protecting these centers. Therefore, in general, the nuclearization of Central Asian countries will increase their security vulnerability.
Omid Rahimi, is the researcher of Institute of East Strategic Studies.
News code:3656
