India has turned to one of the most influential players in Central Asia during the recent years. Holding two rounds of talks with the Central Asian countries, including Afghanistan, in a P5+1 framework, New Delhi’s presence in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the development of bilateral political-security interactions with the regional countries are among the signs of this change. However, India’s disagreements with China and lack of direct land access to Central Asia are two major problems for New Delhi. India hopes to achieve a sustainable path to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and even Europe through Iran’s strategic port of Chabahar. Therefore, in proportion to the expansion of India-Central Asia relations, we should expect the promotion of Iran’s role. In this regard, we have arranged an interview with Mr. Seyyed Mohammad Morteza. He is a PhD student of India-Central Asia relations in Academy of International Studies in Jamia Millia Islamia University (New Delhi). Mr. Morteza also has 18 years of experience in digital journalism and is the senior editor of India TV news channel.

Q: In October 2020, India held the second meeting of of the India-Central Asia Dialogue. Could it be considered a “development” in India-Central Asia relations? How?
Morteza: Of course, Central Asia is very dear to India’s foreign policy objectives. When India brought out its Connect Central Asia Policy in 2012, there were three major interests, Energy resources, Counter-terrorism by advancing itself in Afghanistan and also finding the new trade and market avenues in the region. Central Asia is giving India an extra arm’s length of strategic depth in whole region. Today its relations with all the CA states are on strategic level. India is not only trying to get bigger pie of CA energy resources, it is also building defence relations with annual bilateral joint exercises. Among all CA states, India’s relations with Uzbekistan is going on new level. Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev visited India in 2018 and 2019 in the gap of just four months. India is buying
Uranium from Uzbekistan and both countries are also looking for joint production of defence equipments. India is also building the same chemistry is Kazakhstan. Tajikistan became famous in India for its first foreign military base and with Kyrgyzstan, India is getting very cozier in recent years. There is wide prospects in bilateral relations. Turkmenistan, the hub of gas reserves in CA would soon start pumping gas through TAPI pipeline, the new completion dates is scheduled in 2021, hopefully.
India is investing in connectivity with Central Asia through credit lines to these nations. Apart from economic and energy interests the main area of concern for India is Afghanistan as well as Pakistan. India’s strong presence across Durand line will keep Pakistan on its toes and it is possible with stable Afghanistan and Central Asia.
I think the annual dialogue between Central Asia and India should elevate to new level as in 2019, the then foreign Minister of India Late Sushma Swaraj proposed to have India-Central Asia Development Group at Government to Government level. It sounds more productive in practice as it would include close coordination of respective business chambers. It would also act as a unique platform for India in Central Asia that may act better than what we are getting in groups like SCO.
 
Q: India has developed relations with Central Asia in recent years. At the same time, China has also become an influential player in the region, while Russia perceives the region as its “Near Abroad”. How do you assess the mechanism of India's interaction with China and Russia in Central Asia?
Morteza: At  present India cannot match China or Russia in Central Asia. India’s total trade with Central Asian states stand around $ 1.5 billion whereas for China, it is around $50 billion. What India can give Central Asia, is a new market and trade partnership that has no extra territorial ambitions in the region. CA is full of energy resources and they want to diversify their markets, India is one big destination for them. For China, Central Asia is more like a junction for its BRI project from where it wants reach to Europe and Eurasian region. Also, China is emerging as a hegemonic country in the region, not just because of debt pressure but also its policies towards its own Uighur minorities in Xinjiang. India is seen as a power or partner with constructive approach. But despite all advances from India, it is not easy to match China’s involvement in the region.
As far as Russia is concern, SCO is a platform where India, Russia China and CA States meet each other but it is also losing its sheen with India rejected to join multilateral military exercise this year which had Russia, China, and Pakistan along with CA states as participants. India’s presence in Central Asia is very much depends on the room provided by Russia since 1990s, as you said it perceives this region as its backyard. But India is also making its exclusive space along with the presence of Russia and China, which are more geographically linked to the region.
 
Q: fghanistan has been always present on India's major events with Central Asian Republics. How do you assess the importance of Afghanistan in India's relations with Central Asia?
Morteza: India’s policy towards Central Asia is very much depends on security situation of Afghanistan where India would like to see least role of Pakistan in near future. India’s presence and involvement in Afghanistan is a cause of worry for Islamabad as they repeatedly accuse that India is trying to encircle Pakistan by building strategic relationship with Kabul. As Pakistan denies India road link towards Afghanistan or Central Asian region, the route through Iran and Afghanistan remains the only other land link to Central Asia. Afghanistan is special invitee to India-Central Asia dialogue and it shows the importance Kabul for India. India see Afghanistan as CA+1 partner which has a role to play in India’s reach towards Central Asia and vice versa.
India is trying to multiply its trade with CAR and it is only possible through Chabahar port and then further moving north either through Turkmenistan or Afghanistan. The new road rail networks between Iran and Afghanistan will help not only India but whole of South Asia regional states that are not directly linked with Central Asia and here Afghanistan provides the most viable trade route.
 
Q: TAPI is a significant project that can provide India the Central Asian energy resources. However, the project seems to be at a standstill. How does India see the future of TAPI? 
Morteza: TAPI’s execution is really taking time with new revising dates of completion. This $7.6 billion project is a win-win situation for all the partners. Afghanistan will earn transit revenue, India and Pakistan will get cheap gas. This is the reason that despite worst of relations, India and Pakistan didn’t think for a second to pull out of this project. India is an energy hungry nation and TAPI would solve this appetite. After its official inception in December 2015, this ‘peace pipeline’ as it is called can become an example of Indo-Pak relations in long term. Turkmenistan will transport its gas to Afghanistan (5 bcm), Pakistan and India (14 bcm each) for three decades, so this project can transform South Asia’s energy requirement. And this project is also pulling other nations like Uzbekistan and Saudi Arabia who wants to invest in TAPI.
On security issue, I believe that even with Taliban, the TAPI can survive in Afghanistan. Taliban had pledged its support to the project as they know that it will generate employment on very large scale. Afghanistan will also earn revenue of about $400 million annually. So with multi partners like Pakistan and possibly Saudi Arabia, Taliban would accommodate itself with new energy geopolitics. This pipeline is about mutual interest and with Taliban shaking hands with Unites States; Indian interests too can accommodate new emerging realities of Afghanistan.
 
Q: INSTC and especially the port of Chabahar is the main access route for India to Central Asia. In this regard, Iran, India and Uzbekistan held a joint meeting in Chabahar today. How do you see the dimensions and consequences of such these meetings? 
Morteza: Chabahar is a strategic port that is just 70 kilometeres away from Gwadar, the Chinese entry gate to Arabian sea. So India realised the usage of Chabahar with regards to its approach to Central Asia as well as to counter CPEC at very right stage. India is very serious about this project. This is the reason that when there were some media reports and apprehensions about India's engagement in Chabahar-Zahedan railway project, Indian foreign minister as well as defence minister paid visit to Iran in a gap of week in September 2020. It shows that there is clarity in India on Chabahar port. Now Uzbekistan also wants to use Chabahar port to get a transit point through Persian Gulf. Soon more countries from Central Asia and Eurasian region will follow Uzbekistan and this port will become Entry Gate to 'Greater' Central Asia.
The chemistry of India and Uzbekistan is important to be noticed here. India's relation with Uzbekistan is growing very fast in next two years both countries are aiming to triple their annual bilateral trade to $1 billion. It is only possible through Chabahar whose capacity will increase manyfold in coming future. It is good to see that economic interests are binding India, Uzbekistan and Iran together because they also share the same concerns in relation to Afghanistan. A peaceful Afghanistan is also good for Iran and it is good for Central Asia, specially Uzbekistan that faces threats from terror groups like IMU which operates in Af-Pak region. These factors also shows that India and Iran, despite low in their relations kept engaged with eachother. At the same time Iran is reaching to China with much bigger plans but cautiously. India is aware of this development and knows that Iran is trying to find a pole to counter US designs in the region. But China cannot replace India in Chabahar as it is already involved in CPEC running down to Gwadar. So as per geography, India and  Central Asia will remain Iran's immediate neighbours.

Q: As a final question, are there other capacities for Iran-India cooperation in Central Asia besides the INSTC?
Morteza: Iran is playing an anchor role in India-Central Asia relations. Without Iran, India  cannot think about connecting with Central Asia till it has drowning relations with Pakistan and China. And through Iran, India has many possibilities. Apart from INSTC, the northern bound railway route through Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, that comes under Ashgabat agreement is already operational. This route safe and has advantages with transporting rich minerals from Central Asia to India. It can be used to transport titanium, uranium, copper, ferroalloys, iron ore etc. So Iran will always hold the very important key of India's access to Central Asia.
This cooperation between India and Iran will gain momentum if Iran is relieved of sanctions. And then many more nations would join INSTC and Chabahar projects. Then its not just that only Oil and gas will add up to Iran's revenue. The INSTC and Chabahar will become Land based 'Suez' link between South Asia and Central Asia and up to Europe. These projects will add too much positivity in Iran-India relations because while Iran will be used as transit point, the ultimate destination would be Indian markets and for India, it would be exploring new horizons for its products.