Since the middle of second decade of 21^st century, the relations between China and Central Asia were mainly affected by the neighborhood considerations and bilateral economic and political ties. However, concluding the peaceful uprising strategy up to 2010, and actually, after the Xi Jinping’s presidency, it has been more complicated than ever. Internationalization of China-Central Asia relations thorough the “Belt and Road Initiative”, the movements of Uyghurs in Xinjiang which led to attracting special attention of the world community, Western provocations in Central Asia against Chinese interests, the debt crisis of countries in the region, targeted terrorist attacks on Chinese facilities that makes China’s military presence in the region necessary, could be all mentioned among these factors. The situation defined several areas of convergence and divergence between Washington, Moscow and Beijing. It could be also more complicated after the young leaders shift into the power and made the current era as a “transition period”. So, we have talked to Professor Zhang Xin on the basis and consequences of China’s approach toward Central Asia. Professor Zhang is Research Associate at the Center for Russian Studies, Center for Co-development with Neighboring Countries (Shanghai University-Based Think Tank) since 2012. He is also visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science in Reed College, Oregon, United States.

Q: China has had good and high-level relations with Central Asian countries. However, we see that in recent weeks, the P5 + 1 platform has also expanded to the relations. What is the reason behind that? In other words, what has been lacking in Sino-Central Asian relations that lead to P5+1 platform?
Zhang Xin: The main reason is that the Chinese state would like to take the five countries of Central Asia as a whole and further develop dialogue mechanisms and possible policy coordination with the Central Asia as a whole. In the past, China developed its official relations with Central Asian countries mostly on bilateral basis or through regional multilateral mechanisms such as SCO. The 5+1 mechanism also builds on and possibly will expand on some recent experiences of working in similar "X+1" mechanisms in other areas (e.g. 16+1 mechanism between China and Central Eastern European countries.)
 
Q: China has begun a growing relationship with Central Asian countries since 2010. However, the relations grew on economics and trade, and some kind of politics. The security ties have grown more slowly in SCO and bilateral approaches. How do you see the prospect of China-Central Asia security cooperation?
Zhang Xin: During the first decade of SCO, security cooperation between China and Central Asian countries through SCO have been quite successful. The more recent push for more economic cooperation between China and Central Asia is largely built on bilateral basis and has achieved success in a rather selective manner. In the intermediate term, Central Asia will continue to be of great interest to China for its implications for border security, energy security, infrastructure and transportation, export market, and cultural and civilizational re-awakening along the Belt and Road Initiative. It will likely be taken as a show-case for China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In the field of security cooperation, for quite some time, China develops mostly a "security through development" nexus in Central Asia, building security through facilitating economic development. In the near future, China may gradually switch to the reserve nexus: to take securitization measures in order to boost economic and social development.
 
Q: Following the 2016 terrorist attack on the Chinese Embassy in Bishkek and due to Beijing’s large investments in the region through BRI and other projects, some believe China’s military presence in the Region to secure its interests, is inevitable. What do you think about it? Is it possible to see a Chinese military base in one of the countries in the region?
Zhang Xin: Military presence, including a Chinese military base in Central Asia, of total possibility, given the genuine need for more direct, effective protection of economic interest of Chinese agencies in the region. Given its overall foreign policy principles, however, the Chinese state takes the establishment of overseas military facilities with very high level of caution. The focus in the intermediate range is still on developing multiple alternative arrangements together with local agents in the region to better protect Chinese interest in the region.
 
Q: One of the issues of concern for Central Asian countries is the situatio of the Uyghurs in China’s Xinjiang, which has become a social and security issue due to instigation of the West. How do you think this will affect Sino-Central Asian relations?
Zhang Xin: It negatively impacts Sino-Central Asian relations, especially countries like Kazakhstan. It is a very tough challenge for China’s domestic policy and does have security implications for Central Asian countries.
 
Q: In the case of Hong Kong, we saw that the Central Asia states could not stand with China against the West. What do you think about the reason? Does China want to have these countries as its close political partners?
Zhang Xin: National states of Central Asian countries overall view recent events in Hong Kong as China’s domestic affairs and do not feel necessary to voice their opinions. Besides, unlike the situation in Xinjiang, what happens in Hong Kong also has much less direct bearings on Central Asian countries.   
 
Q: As a final question, many analysts consider the development of Sino-Central Asian relations as based on the views of Xi Jinping. Do you think this view is correct? Will the next presidents continue this process?
Zhang Xin: The current leadership definitely has his strong personal marks on China’s overall foreign policy, as it should be. However, the direction of modification and changes in China’s foreign policy stance, including its relations with Central Asia, are largely driven by structural factors, beyond single leadership. A lot of the changes we see in China’s foreign policy stance, esp. its relations with developing countries (Central Asia included) started actually during the second term of President Hu Jintao’s tenure. So, I’d expect to see general contiguity with this process for the next national leadership, although certain aspect of the leadership’s working style, e.g. the way BRI will be promoted, might receive some modification for the next leadership.