By: Mir Ahmad Mashal
9 Minutes Reading

What you will read here

*Introduction
*Factors Weakening the Taliban’s Desire for War
*Possibility of the Taliban's Engagement in War
*The Taliban's Approach Toward Internal Opponents
*Conclusion 

Introduction
One of the remarkable phenomena in the recent history of Afghanistan is the emergence of a group called the "Taliban." Emerging during the heated civil wars of the 1990s, the Taliban, contrary to the expectation suggested by its name (which implies a group engaged in religious study), became widely known as a group of relentless fighters who shaped thirty years of Afghanistan's history through warfare. Not only did the Taliban rise to prominence in the 1990s conflict, but despite the presence of 130,000 foreign troops and 300,000 local military forces, it never backed down from the war.

The secret to the success of this group was its ability to overcome the opposing forces, even when those forces included NATO. Given this, it can be assumed that the Taliban's perception of war as the best tool to achieve its objectives has become deeply ingrained in the group's mindset. However, will the nature of the Taliban’s regime (after it has established itself as a government) still be inclined toward war? This article aims to answer this question, along with others, such as the boundaries of war under the Taliban government.

Factors Weakening the Taliban’s Desire for War
It is indisputable that in the past, the Taliban was closely tied to war, and through war, it achieved its goals. But can this still be true in the present, given the current circumstances? The answer to this question is somewhat negative for the following reasons.
First, since the Taliban's return to power, it has placed political neutrality at the cornerstone of its foreign policy. Having done nothing but fight in the past, the Taliban has now based its foreign policy strategy on political neutrality in order to repair its international image. To demonstrate its commitment to this policy, the Taliban launched widespread media campaigns, and senior government officials consistently echoed this approach in their statements. In practice, over the past three years, the Taliban has maintained political neutrality in international conflicts, and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued statements that clearly reflect this neutrality.

The second position the Taliban has taken in its foreign policy is economic orientation. In fact, the main strategy that currently guarantees the survival of this group in power is the development of economic relations with other countries, especially neighboring ones. Economic orientation helps the Taliban government in two ways:

1. Securing Financial independence: By expanding economic interactions, the Taliban can secure a portion of the government's financial and consumption resources independently.
2. Reducing the image of a warlike group: Expanding economic interactions convinces other countries, especially neighboring ones, that the Taliban is no longer a militant group and is now focused on economic development for both themselves and others.

The third position, which implicitly overlaps with the economic orientation, is defining Afghanistan as a "hub" or regional crossroad. Although this policy was promoted by the previous Afghan government and some symbolic measures were taken in this regard, the Taliban has made more progress than the previous government and has shown a strong determination to position Afghanistan as a regional hub. It is clear that the primary prerequisite for achieving such a goal is the peaceful conduct of the Taliban government. Naturally, if the Taliban engage in conflict with its neighbors, no party will be inclined to invest in Afghanistan, which would negate the possibility of turning Afghanistan into a regional hub.

 

In fact, vital projects like TAPI, CASA-1000, the Trans-Afghan Railway project, and others, which would transform Afghanistan into a central point of regional connection and transit, all depend on the Taliban refraining from conflicts, particularly with neighboring countries.

Another important factor contributing to the Taliban's restraint from engaging in war is its effort to gain legitimacy by declaring political neutrality and avoiding conflict. The Taliban government, which had become discouraged from being recognized as a legitimate state in international forums due to its domestic actions, has focused primarily on accommodating the interests of others. As mentioned earlier, the Taliban has adopted the principle of neutrality, which is based on avoiding war and conflict, in an attempt to be recognized as a peace-seeking government by international organizations. In other words, the Taliban has placed great importance on its policy of neutrality and avoiding conflict with other countries, in its quest for international recognition. In practice, during the three years of the Taliban's rule, aside from a few minor border skirmishes in the first year, there has been no significant action indicating that the Taliban is inclined toward war. It is worth noting that the Taliban government, by deploying trained forces in border areas and educating border guards on the principles of border management, has completely prevented border conflicts, and the frequency of such incidents has almost been reduced to zero in the last two years.
 

Possibility of the Taliban's Engagement in War
Several factors indicate that the Taliban has shifted from a group with a warlike nature to a group with a non-confrontational, engagement-oriented approach. However, what will happen if war is presented as the only option or the most effective choice for the group in certain situations? In other words, what are the limits and boundaries of the Taliban resorting to war, and how far will it go? Another question is whether any potential war for the Taliban would be a limited skirmish or a full-scale war.

As explained above, the Taliban currently avoids war and conflict whenever possible, in order to achieve its economic goals and gain recognition as a government in the international community—or at least be tolerated by its neighboring countries. However, it is possible that a situations arise that force the group to resort to war. In such cases, what will the Taliban do, and how far will it escalate the conflict?

While it is not now possible to give a definitive answer to this question, current indications suggest that the Taliban government, at least in the foreseeable future, will likely avoid entering into a full-scale war. This is not only because the Taliban must abandon the option of war and violence in order to achieve its economic and political goals, but also because the group, does not have sufficient strength in terms of the number and readiness of its forces, facilities, and logistics, and cannot engage in a widespread and full-scale conflict. Most importantly, in the current mindset of the Taliban, war has lost its status as a useful and effective tool for achieving external objectives.

However, there are situations where the Taliban may be forced to provide a military response. In such cases, as inferred from the Taliban's behavior over the past three years, the group would likely limit its response to a limited harassing war, which is noisy and attention-grabbing, but not a full-scale war.

A question that arises here is: If the Taliban government no longer wishes to engage in a war, why has it taken a provocative stance against Pakistan by sheltering Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) - an insurgent group that opposes the Pakistani government- thus creating a potential for conflict with a neighboring country? While a detailed discussion of the TTP is beyond the scope of this writing, it can be summarized that the creation and operation of the TTP is more a result of Pakistan's military-political agenda than the Taliban's own intentions. In reality, it is Pakistan that uses the TTP for its own purposes, not the Taliban government. Even assuming the Taliban provided shelter to the TTP, this does not mean it desire to engage in a conflict with the Pakistani government. Rather, the Taliban's goal is to keep the channel for negotiation with the Pakistani government open via the TTP, rather than engaging in a full-scale war and confrontation with Pakistan.

The Taliban's Approach Toward Internal Opponents
Although it has become somewhat clear that the Taliban government does not consider war as an effective tool for foreign policy or as a means to achieve its political and security objectives, does this approach apply to internal groups as well?

Despite the fact that the option of war and resorting to violence is almost eliminated in the Taliban's foreign policy and interactions with other countries, when it comes to internal opponents, the Taliban government sees war and repression as the only useful tool. As in the past and as observed during the three years of Taliban rule, this government will respond with military action and decisiveness toward internal groups, regardless of their aims or ideologies. The behavior of the Taliban has shown that, at present, this government is not willing to share power with internal opposition groups, and always seeks to eliminate its opponents through a strategy of exclusion.

Conclusion
Although the Taliban was able to achieve its primary objectives in the past through violence and war, this was more applicable during the earlier period when the Taliban had not yet evolved into a political and administrative structure. In the post-war context, where the Taliban now finds itself as a responsible government, restraint and avoiding conflict—especially with a neighboring country—has become vital for the group.

Currently, the Taliban cannot afford to engage in a full-scale or even a harassing conflict with an external country. The main reason for this is the Taliban's shift from a hostile insurgent group to a governing entity. Unlike the past, when the survival of the Taliban was dependent on war, in this new phase, the group's survival and the recognition of its government depend on distancing itself from war and conflict. This is because the Taliban has laid the foundation of its government on economic development, and through this approach, it aims to stabilize the country's economic affairs. Therefore, it is inevitable for the group to avoid military confrontation with others, particularly its neighbors.

The Taliban government also holds high expectations that its policy of avoiding war will help facilitate the recognition of its government. In fact, it can be said that, in the current situation, the Taliban has no significant place for the option of war, which would lead to divergence. Instead, it has made economic cooperation its central strategy, which would lead to convergence. One can even interpret the Taliban’s recent passivity and reduction in verbal confrontations regarding Pakistan's attacks on Afghan soil as an indication of this shift. However, despite the Taliban's avoidance of engaging in war with an external country (especially neighboring countries), the group shows no flexibility when it comes to internal opposition groups, and it considers military action as the only solution for suppressing domestic opponents.

 Mir Ahmad Mashaal is a senior expert of International Relations.