By: Zahra Mahmoudi

Introduction
During his visit to Pakistan, Iran's President Ebrahim Raisi met with Asif Ali Zardari Pakistan's President, Shahbaz Sharif Prime Minister of Pakistan and other officials, including Pakistan Army Chief General Asim Munir. This visit was in line with Iran’s neighborhood policy and the development of relations with Islamic and aligned countries. In these meetings, agreements were also made regarding the expansion of bilateral relations and cooperation in various spheres. This article explains and analyzes the goals and outcomes of this visit, its impact on the relations between the two countries, and the existing considerations in Pakistan-Iran relations.
 
1) History of Iran–Pakistan relations
Iran and Pakistan have a common border of about 900 kilometers, and there are significant similarities between these two countries in the fields of religion, history, language (all the words used in the national anthem of Pakistan - except for one word - are Persian words), art and culture. Iran was the first country to recognize Pakistan after its independence, and relations between the two countries began on August 14, 1947. After the Iranian Revolution, Pakistan was also the first country to recognize Islamic Republic of Iran. During these decades, Pakistan and Iran have maintained friendly relations, and except for a few irritants (including the presence of militant groups such as Jaish-al-Adl and Ansar al-Furqan in Pakistan, the issue of influence in Afghanistan, and the killing of Shias in Pakistan by sectarian groups), there has been no major conflict between the two countries.

After the complete withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan and the return of the Taliban to power in 2021, Pakistan's cooperation with Iran has increased to promote peace and stability in Afghanistan, and none of them wants Afghanistan to become a field of geopolitical competition. However, the cooperation between the two countries is less than the existing capacities. The US sanctions against Iran could be the reason in this regard; However, the lack of political will on both sides can also be effective. Nevertheless, the positive points of the relationship far outweigh the conflicts between the two countries, and a large number of Pakistanis have a positive view of Iran.
 
2) Iran's goals in this visit
Ebrahim Raisi was the first president of a country who visited Pakistan after the formation of the new government in this country. During this visit, eight cooperation documents in the fields of trade, science and technology, agriculture, health, culture and legal and judicial issues were signed between the two countries. Creation of Free Trade Zones at common border crossings, cooperation in the field of cinema and media, cooperation in the animal health sector, security cooperation, cooperation in the social welfare sector, cooperation in the standards sector and cooperation in the legal sector and judicial assistance in civil and commercial affairs, were among the most important cooperation documents signed between the two countries. There was also an emphasis on the importance of regular cooperation between political, military and security authorities of the two countries to fight threats such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, hostage taking and money laundering. Beyond the signing of the aforementioned agreements, the goals of Ebrahim Raisi's first foreign visit in 2024 can be considered as follow:

A- Returning and deepening trust in Iran–Pakistan relations
Tensions between Islamabad and Tehran increased in 2017, when members of Jaish al-Adl martyred 10 Iranian border guards and then fled across the border to Pakistan. At the time, Major General Mohammad Bagheri Iran's Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, urged Pakistan to battle this group, warning that if it did not do so, Tehran had the ability to target terrorist "safe havens" anywhere. However, Islamabad insists that the group does not have any organized presence in the Balochistan region or elsewhere in Pakistan. Another attack by Jaish al-Adl in 2019 led to the martyrdom of 27 employees and border guards of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The attack of Jaish al-Adl in Rask On December 14, 2023, resulted in the martyrdom of a number of police forces and soldiers.

But after the explosions that occurred on January 3, 2024 in Kerman city, Iran, during the fourth anniversary of General Soleimani’s martyrdom, Iran launched a missile attack on the headquarters of the Jaish al-Adl group in Balochistan province of Pakistan on January 16, 2024, in response to the explosions in Kerman. The interim government of Pakistan condemned the attack, recalled its ambassador from Tehran, and banned the Iranian ambassador in Islamabad - who was then in Iran - from returning to Pakistan. Later, Pakistan launched a missile attack on the border areas of Saravan city, claiming to target members of the Balochistan Liberation Army and the Baloch Liberation Front, and as a result, the relations between the two countries deteriorated.
But Raisi's recent visit to Pakistan, which took place after the new government took office in the country, can be interpreted as a visit to restore relations and improve mutual trust. In fact, this visit was an opportunity to get relations back on track, and fix the damages caused by the missile attacks of both sides on each other.

B- Emphasizing on border security and combating terrorism
The key to Iran-Pakistan relations is the border management of the two countries. Asim Munir, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, described the border of the two countries as a "border of peace and friendship", and emphasized the need to improve coordination in order to prevent Iran-Pakistan’s long-standing relations from being endangered by terrorists. Border management can be better done through pursuing official trade and limiting smuggling.

The cooperation of the two countries to fight terrorism was another goal considered by Iran during this visit. Since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan, Pakistan has witnessed an increase in violence in Pakistan by the Pakistani Taliban based in Afghanistan, and this has caused some challenges in Pakistan's relations with the Taliban government. Also, the terrorist attacks in Shah Cheragh shrine of Iran in October 2022, and July 2023 by ISKP (which is present in Afghanistan) also shows the importance of combating the terrorist groups present in Afghanistan for Iran. Accordingly, Pakistan and Iran pledged to increase efforts in a "united front" against terrorist groups based in Afghanistan, whose presence is considered a serious threat to regional and global security.

C- Managing the effects of Iran's missile attack on the Zionist regime on Iran-Pakistan’s bilateral relations
After the Zionist regime attacked Iran’s consulate in Damascus on 1 April, 2024, Iran responded to the Zionist regime with unprecedented direct missile and drone attacks. After Iran's retaliatory action, Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs anounced: “It is now critically urgent to stabilize the situation and restore peace. We call on all parties to exercise utmost restraint and move towards de-escalation.” Islamabad also considered The current situation as a result of the UN Security Council's failure to fulfill its responsibilities in maintaining international peace and security, and emphasized the necessity of international efforts to prevent further hostilities in the region, and announce a ceasefire in Gaza.  Pakistan's effort to reduce tension shows that this country is worried about the consequences of any possible conflict in its neighborhood.

It should be noted that the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan did not reflect the general sentiments of the people of this country. Pakistanis are generally against the Zionist regime, and after Iran's missile attack on the Zionist regime, they celebrated on the streets. Not only did the public opinion of Pakistan support Iran's military action against the Zionist regime, but also a part of the public opinion supports the direct participation of the Pakistani army in the battle with the Zionist regime. These feelings are caused by the crimes of the Zionist regime and decades of killing the Palestinian people.

Pakistan refuses to recognize the Zionist regime and has long demanded the creation of an independent Palestinian state. In recent years, there has been increasing speculation about pressure from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) on Pakistan to make changes in its policy on Palestine, but these pressures do not seem to have affected Islamabad's position.

Raisi's visit to Pakistan took place only a few days after the escalation of the conflict between Iran and the Zionist regime, and in a situation where Iran sees itself in a favorable position in the Middle East. During this visit, Sharif praised Iran's strong stand on the issue of Palestine and emphasized that Pakistan is also with the Palestinians. In a joint statement, Iran and Pakistan acknowledged that the irresponsible action of the Zionist regime has caused the escalation of tension in the region, and called on the UN Security Council to prevent the Israeli regime from its adventurism in the region, and prevent its illegal acts in attacking its neighbors.

D- Expanding trade and economic cooperation
The current level of trade between Iran and Pakistan is approximately $2 billion, and there is significant potential for growth in areas such as energy, agriculture, and manufacturing. Informal trade between the two countries includes commodities such as Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and crude oil. Iran also supplies electricity to parts of Pakistan. In 2020, Iran's exports to Pakistan had reached $352 million, which made this country the third export destination for Iranian goods. According to Iran's customs statistics, in the first half of 2022, Iran's exports to Pakistan were $321 million, and imports from Pakistan reached $110 million. Tehran and Islamabad expressed their desire to strengthen economic relations, and during the Raisi's visit, it was announced that Iran plans to increase bilateral trade to 10 billion dollars.

The restrictions caused by sanctions have caused the two countries to look for solutions outside the framework of sanctions, in the form of barter trade and border markets, with the participation of local chambers of commerce to expand bilateral trade. Planning to create 12 border markets has been done in this direction. Therefore, overcoming the US sanctions and finding ways to cooperate, despite external pressures, will be a key challenge for Iran and Pakistan.

Also, formalizing border trade, and tackling illegal trade in the form of goods smuggling is also one of the other solutions considered by the parties in this field. In May 2023, the Pakistan Petroleum Dealers Association claimed that 35% of diesel for sale in Pakistan, was smuggled across Iran borders. Of course, providing alternative means of livelihood for illegal sellers is one of the requirements that should be considered by the two countries, because otherwise, the continuous effort to formalize border trade is likely to increase internal anger and dissatisfaction, spread poverty, and pave the way for recruitment to extremist groups.

E- following up the progress of Iran - Pakistan gas pipeline project
The Peace Pipeline Agreement signed in 2010 envisaged the daily supply of 750 to 1 billion cubic feet of natural gas for 25 years from Iran's South Pars gas field to Pakistan. The pipeline was supposed to extend over 1900 km (1150 km inside Iran and 781 km inside Pakistan). The Iranian side fulfilled its commitment before the scheduled time (before the deadline of December 2014) and spent $2 billion to build the gas pipeline near the Pakistani border, but the construction on the Pakistani side has not yet started. In 2014, Pakistan requested to extend the 10-year deadline for the construction of the pipeline, which expires in September 2024. Islamabad has suspended the project several times due to fear of the consequences of US sanctions. Iran has warned Pakistan that the violation of the contract by Pakistan will lead to referring the issue to international arbitration, and Iran will demand $18 billion in compensation for the losses. Iran also set a deadline of March 2024 for starting the construction of the project in Pakistan. March 2024, Islamabad announced that it is seeking exemption from US sanctions for this pipeline. However, at the same time, the US publicly announced that it did not support this project and warned of the risk of sanctions for Islamabad if it trades with Tehran. However, Pakistan announced that according to its government approvals, it will build 80 kilometer of the pipeline from its border with Iran to the port city of Gwadar in southwestern Balochistan province in the first phase. During Raisi's recent visit to Pakistan, pipeline completion strategies that are outside the scope of US sanctions were discussed, and it was pointed out that the Pakistani side should accelerate the implementation of its commitments in the field of energy.

F- Deepening public diplomacy
Iran and Pakistan have close cultural and religious relations, and many Pakistani Muslims and Shias travel to Iran to visit religious places. This meeting provided an opportunity to further strengthen people-to-people contact and promote cultural exchanges between the two nations. The citizens of Iran and Pakistan may have different views on the relations between the two countries, so the need to manage public perception and further expand of cultural relations was taken into consideration.
 
3) Pakistan's goals for hosting Iran's president
Beside the importance of the visit of Iran’s President to Pakistan, Islamabad also sought to achieve its desired goals by hosting President Raisi, which are as follows:

A- Pakistan's need to restore ties with Iran
Pakistan has border conflicts with India and Afghanistan. The disputes over Kashmir region as well as the Durand line has caused tensions and conflicts between Pakistan and the two mentioned countries. Therefore, a stable and strategic relationship with Iran has always been of great importance for Pakistan. Islamabad does not want another front to be opened on its western borders with Iran, which can result in weakening its ability to deal with India as well as its numerous internal problems. Therefore, like Iran, Pakistan also intends to improve bilateral relations after the 2024 missile attacks and witness peace and stability in the region. Achieving this goal will require delicate diplomacy, preventing the escalation of conflicts, taking confidence-building measures, and the willingness to address the main causes of the conflict and resolve it peacefully.

B- Supplying Gas for Pakistan
Pakistan desperately needs cheap gas for heating and energy supply. It is because the domestic reserves of Pakistan are decreasing rapidly, and due to existing inflation, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) import contracts have made energy sources more expensive. Natural gas makes up the largest proportion of Pakistan's energy use, nearly a third of which is imported. Meanwhile, Islamabad is implementing long-term economic reforms, due to the requirements of the International Monetary Fund. It will lead to a historic increase in energy prices at a time when inflation is around 29 percent. This harsh reforms will cause protests, leading to high electricity bills and sharp increases in fuel prices. Pakistan's internal and external debts are also increasing. Meanwhile, Iran has the second largest gas reserves in the world after Russia, and can meet most of Pakistan's needs through the Peace Pipeline. Instead of telling explicitly to Iran that it cannot build the pipeline due to US sanctions, Pakistan seems to be looking for ways to bypass the said sanctions. For this reason, Islamabad announced last month that it would try to get an exemption from the United States sanctions to build the pipeline on its soil. Of course, Pakistan can bypass US banking sanctions by not paying dollars for Iranian gas, or by barter trading. However, there is little chance that Pakistan will be able to purchase Iranian gas through barter trade in the long term. If Pakistan manages to reach the second phase of this project (after the implementation of the first phase of 80 km), it would extend the pipeline to the southern region of the country, which may be very expensive for this cash-strapped country.

C-Strengthening trade relations with Iran
The improvement of Iran-Saudi Arabia relations with the mediation of China, and the growing economic relations between Iran and China can help Pakistan to strengthen its economic and trade relations with Iran and benefit from its positive effects. In this regard, Pakistan can fully use the complementary potential of Gwadar and Chabahar ports, if Iran participates in China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project. Also, the strengthening of Iran-Pakistan’s economic relations can lead to the creation of jobs and the improvement of the livelihood of Pakistani people who are facing many economic problems.
 
4) Considerations in Pakistan-Iran relations
Although the restoration of Iran-Pakistan relations and the possibility of deepening peace and stability in the relations between the two countries have occurred after the recent Raisi’s visit to Pakistan, away from the media and propaganda hype, the existing considerations in Iran-Pakistan relations should also be taken into account in order to make a correct assessment close to the reality in this regard. Some of the most important considerations are as follows:

A- Saudi Arabia variable
The geopolitical interests of Tehran and Islamabad are diverse, which causes complexity in the dynamics of relations between the two countries. For instance, Pakistan has strong security and military ties with Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, Iran-backed Houthis have been fighting in Yemen with the coalition led by Saudi Arabia for several years. Also, Pakistan is mired in economic problems, and with a population of approximately 241 million, it needs billions of dollars in foreign exchange to repay international debts and close its trade deficit this fiscal year. Saudi Arabia, along with the United Arab Emirates, have promised to invest 50 billion dollars in direct investment for economic revival in Pakistan over 5 years. It is while Iran is not capable of such investment in Pakistan, due to its economic situation and sanctions. However, Pakistan is trying to maintain its relations with Iran, without losing Saudi Arabia on the other side. For this reason, Pakistan seeks to consider the considerations of Iran and Saudi Arabia together by establishing a balance.

B-The U.S variable
The diversity of geopolitical interests of Tehran and Islamabad is also noticeable in relation to the U.S. Iran supports Shia groups, including the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon, which have occasionally targeted the United States and its allies in the Middle East. On the other hand, the United States wants to restrain Iran and uses sanctions in this direction. In other words, the United States is caught in a strategic regional battle with Iranians, and wants to limit Iran's breathing space even more through sanctions. At the same time, Pakistan needs the US and Western goodwill to help it deal with its economic crisis. For this reason, after Pakistan promised more security and economic cooperation with Iran during Ibrahim Raisi’s visit, the United States warned Pakistan about the risk of sanctions. It is clear that this stance was taken with the aim of dissuading Pakistan and increasing the cost of trade with Iran. Currently, it seems that any expansion of formal trade and banking transactions between the two countries will be slow, as Pakistani banks are reluctant to do business directly with Iranian banks. Based on this vision, Pakistan will avoid any action that jeopardizes its relations with the United States and the West. Pakistan does not seem to have many negotiating options with the US, and currently has little leverage over Washington to persuade the US to build and complete the Peace Pipeline. Therefore, Pakistan will try as much as possible to show Iran that it is serious about building the pipeline; and because of this, it has promised to provide financial resources and build the peace pipeline within its own territory. But on the other hand, it shows the US that by not completing the entire project, it will comply with American sanctions against Tehran. With a cost-benefit analysis, Islamabad compares the benefits of cooperation with the United States (such as economic aid and military cooperation due to the existence of an enemy called India), against its potential costs (such as Washington's anger, reduction of relations, imposition of sanctions, further expansion of the US relations with India), and will act accordingly.
 
Conclusion
In the framework of neighborhood revitalization policy and using regional capacities, the high-ranking officials of Iran’s government visited Pakistan, and expressed their political will to improve relations in the political, security and economic spheres. Signing 8 cooperation documents and renaming one of the important streets of Islamabad as "Iran Avenue", confirms this issue.
After the visit and the agreements made between the two countries, some strategic possibilities can be stated:
 

According to Pakistan's behavioral patterns during the last few decades, a different type of bilateral relations will not be formed after this visit. Islamabad knows that deepening relations with Iran carries the risk of US sanctions, which can put more pressure on Pakistan's economy. It seems that Pakistan does not want to provoke Washington's anger by advancing the construction of the pipeline with Iran and deepening relations with Tehran. Currently, Pakistan needs the US much more than Iran, because of its dire economic situation and the urgent need for money from foreign donor countries. That is why that the government of Pakistan did not react to the conflict between the Zionist regime and Iran in a more decisive manner. in fact, Islam Abad wanted to reduce the pressure of the western countries, and increase the chance of concluding another agreement with the International Monetary Fund and other foreign lenders. If Iran decides to refer the Peace Pipeline project to the International Court, Pakistan may defend its performance by declaring that US sanctions have been a serious obstacle to the completion of the Peace Pipeline. Islam Abad may even count on Washington's support to prevent any fines against Pakistan in the international court.

Pakistani decision makers in the field of politics and government have shown that in their relations with Iran (and of course other countries) they always prioritize their own interests. Therefore, another possibility is that Pakistan will not cooperate with the US and its allies against Iran. In fact, keeping in mind the immediate security and economic needs, Pakistan places relations with the US and Iran in this broader picture, and by managing its relations with Iran and the US will maintain interaction with both countries. That is, on the one hand, it says for instance to the US: “Can you help us with what we need, in exchange for not doing business with Iran and not completing the peace pipeline?!” And on the other hand, in relations with Iran, it will mainly emphasize on regional stability and the fight against terrorism.

 All in all, what is clear is that the US and its allies are against the expansion and deepening of Iran-Pakistan relations; It remains unclear whether Islamabad can convince Washington through lobbying and other means to offer waivers, at least on some issues agreed with Iran (such as the construction of the peace pipeline). In such a context, diplomatic skills are of great importance to overcome these conditions.
 
Zahra Mahmoudi; PhD in International Relations