IESS’s Central Asia Working Group
 
Introduction
The 9th meeting of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) was held in Uzbekistan, with developments beyond expectations and predictions; To the extent that its importance can be seen beyond the 8th meeting (2021 in Istanbul) and the structural changes leading to the emergence of OTS. In recent meeting of the heads of the Turkic countries (presumed Turks), a new face of Turkic convergence and its dynamics was displayed, which contrary to the functional tendencies (economic, commercial, technical and cultural) of previous periods, it revealed clear trends of Turkey's unilateralism in political and foreign policy fields, as well as the Republic of Azerbaijan’s attempt to impose its demands on the body of this structure. Issues such as the victimization of the members of OTS in the conflicts between Turkey and the European Union, or the legitimization of interference in the internal affairs of neighbors under the pretext of supporting fellow citizens (of Turkic origin) living in those countries. Trends that are probably not only not considered in line with the security goals and foreign policy of Central Asian countries, but also are of the same kind of issues that the republics of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have tried to avoid them for three decades. Accordingly, this article aims to review the outstanding phenomena and trends of the 9th meeting, as well as examining the areas of disagreement and possible separation of the members of this organization. This areas and gaps can also be summarized as this: "The 9th meeting of the Turkic States; the beginning of Turkic convergence challenges."

What happened in the 9th meeting of OTS?
The 9th summit of Turkic-speaking countries which was held in the form of the Organization of Turkic State summit on November 11 and 12, 2022 in the city of Samarkand, Uzbekistan, was accompanied by remarkable features and commentaries. In this round of meetings, the President of Uzbekistan Shaukat Mirziyoyev hosted the presidents of Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan as main members, as well as the prime minister of Hungary and the former president of Turkmenistan as observer members of OTS. Contrary to claims that Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey made a few days ago, Turkmenistan did not ask for full membership (changing membership from observer to main) in this organization, and contrary to speculations, there was no mention of Hungary's request for full membership either.

Contrary to the predictions and extensive propaganda of the Government of Turkey in recent weeks that "the family photo of the Turkic countries will be completed" in 2022 due to the activation of Ashgabat in this structure, Serdar Berdimuhamedov, the young president of Turkmenistan, did not attend the Samarkand meeting at all, and Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov as the chairman of People’s Council of Turkmenistan, attended the Turkic leaders’ summit.

Another feature of the Uzbekistan 2022 meeting was the acceptance of a new member joining the Turkic States, under the alleged name of "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", which is probably one of the most important (and challenging) developments of the Organization of Turkic States and one of the key milestones in the process of Turkish convergence. In fact, this membership is different from all previous separations and joining, because this self-proclaimed republic has not been recognized by any other country in the world, except Turkey, and accepting its membership (even though as an observer) by this organization means providing grounds for a dispute with the European Union, especially with Greece, and it is probably criticized by other countries and international organizations.

During the 9th meeting of Turkic-speaking leaders, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who is preparing for the upcoming elections in his country, spoke about the consolidation and deepening of the concept of "common security" among the members of OTS. Meanwhile, Ilham Aliyev the President of Azerbaijan, who had started a verbal dispute with the Islamic Republic of Iran a few days ago, also providing an open interpretation of the concepts of Turkic nationalism (and the transnationality of the Turkish identity-building concerns of this organization), and explicitly talked about the efforts to strengthen the Turkic (Azeri) identity of Turkic groups (presumed Turks) in the vicinity of member states borders. Words and claims that even in the most optimistic evaluations, are known as an example of interfering in the internal affairs of neighbors (especially Iran), and a clear sign of leaving good neighborly relations with regional governments (Countries that are adjacent to the borders of Turkic states and have some groups of Turkic origin). It is obviously in contradiction with the alleged political principles and declared security goals of this organization.

Inverted interpretation of the Turkic dream
Given the political, security and economic developments of the Eurasian region in the last year and also after the structural changes of this organization in the past year, it was predicted that the 9th meeting of Turkic-speaking leaders in November 2022 as one of the milestones of this convergence, will witness remarkable phenomena and initiatives. In addition, extensive expert literature and diplomatic statements had been formed, regarding the continuation of the horizontal expansion of this convergence and the full membership of the countries of Turkmenistan and Hungary in OTS. This literature by itself brought to mind a wide perspective of the capacities and capabilities of this convergence and its ability to create structures in the surrounding environment.
                                
But with the arrival of this meeting and the end of the speculations, other facts were displayed which not only conveyed different messages to the world than what was imagined, but also revealed the vulnerabilities of this convergence. Vulnerabilities that were clearly visible this time, not only in the form of expert analysis and views, but in the general atmosphere of this convergence and in the behavior of the members of this organization, especially Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan. In the following, we will review the outstanding features and developments of this meeting in the form of some propositions, with the aim of understanding the various dimensions of the situation:

*Until a few days before the 9th meeting, based on the claims of the Turkish Foreign Minister, it was predicted that the new president of Turkmenistan, Serdar Berdimuhamedov, would participate in the meeting of OTS’ leaders. But this did not happen and the Chairman of the People's Council (former President of Turkmenistan) attended the meeting.

*Until the day of the 9th meeting (and again based on the claim of the Turkish Foreign Minister), the prevailing speculation was that Turkmenistan will be introduced as the new main member of this organization. But during the meeting and its discussions, not only was there no news about the full membership of Turkmenistan, but also no discussion or proposal related to the conversion of Turkmen membership was heard;

*Like the issue of Turkmenistan, the speculations about the full membership of Hungary did not turn out to be true, and consequently, there was no change in the level of Budapest's commitments to the Turkish process.

*The President of Turkey called for the acceleration of the establishment of the joint Turkic Investment Fund, which he had raised in previous meetings and had used as one of the motivations to encourage Turkic-speaking members to actively participate in the structure of Turkic convergence.

*Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, spoke about the consolidation and deepening of the concept of "common security" among Turkic-speaking countries;

*Ilham Aliyev the president of Azerbaijan, who has apparently become a national hero for the Turks after the recent successes (together with Turkey) in the second Karabakh war, has emphasized the necessity of protecting the Turkish identity and the right to be educated in the mother tongue in the Azeri regions of "Iran". He also emphasized that safeguarding the "common Turkish/Azeri identity", and strengthening the cultural-historical awareness of people with Turkish origin (presumed Turks) outside the borders of Turkic-speaking countries, is one of the duties and special tasks of the Organization of Turkic States. Therefore, it was suggested (reminded) to the member countries of OTS to feel responsible for their consanguineous in other countries, and systematically monitor their cultural-identity situation and general conditions. At the same time, with Ilham Aliyev's claim about "the violated rights of 40 million Turks/Azeris"! in the vicinity of the southern borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan (that is, the Azeri provinces of Iran), the official media and various circles of this country also started a wide wave of literature production centered on the creation of a political identity for the so-called "South Azerbaijan". They openly inciting the Azeri ethnic groups of Iran, and openly referred to different cities and geographical regions of Iran as "separated parts" of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

*The acceptance of the Turkic region of Cyprus (with the alleged identity of the Turkic Republic of Northern Cyprus) as an observer member of OTS is also considered one of the most important developments (and perhaps the most important phenomenon) of the 9th meeting of Turkic-speaking leaders - Because the alleged Republic basically has no external presence in the political map of the independent countries of the world, and its sovereignty is only recognized by the Turkish government. The Turkic region of Cyprus that is occupied by the Turkish army (with the intervention of the Turkish army, the northern parts of Cyprus were separated from its southern Christian areas, and the island was divided politically) is considered a part of the island by the European Union and especially Greece. Until the November 2022 meeting in Samarkand, none of Ankara's initiatives for the recognition of this region by other countries and its introduction in international circles have been successful. The United Nations has never recognized the sovereignty and independent political identity of this region, and until today, Turkey's “two-state initiative” (the official recognition of the sovereignty of two independent states on the island of Cyprus) has not been welcomed either. In fact, the issue of Cyprus has been one of the main points of disagreement between the European Union and Ankara regarding Turkey's accession to this union, and one of the chronic points of disagreement between the Greeks and the Turks (and even the Zionist regime).

 
As can be seen, the developments and initiatives of the 9th meeting lack prominent functional dimensions and new attractions. Unlike the previous periods - when its meetings generally included a multitude of ideas and plans for commercial, economic, technical and cultural cooperation among Turkic-speaking members, and it was also considered as the most important field of attracting and persuading countries to join or actively participate in the Turkic structuring process- in the recent meeting, the joint Economic Fund plan was repeated again, and the trends and phenomena of Turkic convergence focused more on political and security concerns. These concerns and discussions seem to have been planned not by all the countries present at the meeting, but only planned, defined and "imposed” by the Republic of Azerbaijan and Turkey. In other words, The axes of political and security (and even cultural) focus of the 9th meeting are not the concerns of members (especially Central Asian governments), but they represent the exclusive will of Ankara and Baku, which have appeared in the form of identity, security and foreign policy discourse of this organization.

Uninvited Guest; Northern Cyprus!
Until today, and outside the structure of the Organization of Turkish States, even the Republic of Azerbaijan (as Turkey's closest ally in recent years) has not recognized the Turkic Republic of Northern Cyprus. Other allies of Ankara, such as Pakistan, have also avoided establishing any official or diplomatic relations with this alleged republic (in contrast to the pattern of non-recognition of the Armenian government by Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, under the pretext of occupying a part of the Islamic lands, i.e., Karabakh).

The reason for this refusal is that the recognition of a separate part of the Cyprus government, considering the historical and political background of this island and the recognition of its independent political identity by international institutions and other countries, especially the European Union and Greece, is a confrontation with the Europeans. On the other hand, this recognition means the acceptance of an unusual process in international custom and law, which by itself, may be cited against the national interests and territorial integrity of these countries (For example, the acceptance of the sovereignty of Northern Cyprus may be used against these governments, in order to recognize the sovereignty of the Crimean Peninsula, the Kashmir region, or Nagorno-Karabakh.)

It should be noted that immediately after Northern Cyprus was accepted as an observer member of OTS, the European Union criticized this decision and issued critical statements rejecting it. The most interesting point of this situation is the presence of Hungary government, as a member of the European Union, and at the same time as an observer member of the mentioned Turkic structure.

In addition to the issue of Northern Cyprus, the concept of "common security" raised by the Turkish president can be evaluated as a double-edged sword. The main challenge of this concept - in addition to the issue of consensus regarding the nature of such security (and anti-security) phenomena - is the agreement on the basis and extent of this "sharing". In other words, the basic problem of this concept (considering the possible costs of any serious decision in the security sphere) is that the security concern of one member of the organization may be defined as a general concern for the entire structure, in such a way that it is necessary for members to mobilize their security capacities for issues that may really have nothing to do with their own national security.
As mentioned in the Cyprus issue, this scenario is very likely that contrary to the general analysis about Turkey's ability to provide security (or balancing) for Turkic-speaking countries (especially in Central Asia) or the willingness of these countries to define such a role for Ankara, this Turkic-based structure is basically designing and developing not in line with the strategic interests of the mentioned countries. Really, this structure is developing in direction of securitization for Turkey, and as a bargaining tool for Ankara and as a capacity to build power for this country in the international political environment. However, the more important issue of this discussion is the "awareness" of "Turkic-speaking" members of Central Asia about the opportunities and challenges (cost-benefit analysis) of the mentioned scenario, and its possible impact on the current convergence and its future trends.

Guarding Turks on the other side of the border!
On the other hand, the issue of paying attention to the Turks (groups of the same descent) outside the territorial limits of the Turkic States, and the systematic protection of their identity elements, which was raised by the President of Azerbaijan, can be mentioned as another challenge of the Organization of the Turkic States. As mentioned in the "common security" discussion, this claim of Ilham Aliyev is one of the cases where the national concerns of one member or even the individual ambitions of one of the Turkic-speaking leaders are represented as a group concern and in the place of one of the general goals of the aforementioned structure.

Meanwhile, it seems that countries like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which have been trying to resolve border and territorial issues with their neighbors for the past three decades and have tried to ensure good neighborliness and non-interference in each other's affairs, do not have the same tendencies as the Republic of Azerbaijan. The pursuit of such goals, even by Kyrgyzstan, which has ongoing border disputes with Tajikistan, seems very unlikely. It is because the type and nature of consanguinity issues in Central Asian countries have many differences with its Caucasian and Azeri types.

About the issue of co-descent with the Turkic-speaking groups living in Iran, which was specifically mentioned in the Samarkand meeting, it should be noted that the approach of the Berdimuhamedov’s  family towards the Turkmen area of Iran (contrary to the claims of Elham Aliyev) has been avoiding interference and maintaining full respect for territorial integrity. This lack of intervention, in addition to foreign policy considerations and international standards, is also caused by the conditions of power structure and the characteristics of internal politics of Turkmenistan, which basically do not have tendency towards Turkmen outside Turkmenistan, and prioritize the relationship with the central governments of the neighbors.

Apart from the discussion of interference in the internal affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, placing the issue of world Turks as one of the priorities of the Organization of Turkic States will, anyway, attract the attention of Russia and China too, and will intensify the doubts of these powers regarding the current process of Turkic convergence.

It is because the existence of republics and regions of Turkic origin in the Caucasian part of the Russian Federation and the public concerns of Russians regarding the cultural-identity (religious) and security developments of these regions, as well as the serious concerns of China regarding the security issues of the Uyghurs and the identity developments of the Turkic regions in In the east of this country. In fact, if the issue of the world's Turkic descendants becomes one of the objective and fixed goals of Turkic convergence, then the approaches and behavior of OTS will be at the intersection with the vital interests and national security of the traditional actors of this region, including Russia, Iran and China. This situation imposes all kinds of costs on the members of this organization, while it is basically not considered in line with the political will and strategic interests of the Central Asian countries (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, as the eastern wings of Turkic convergence).

The future of Turkic convergence
According to what has been said, one of the most likely trends in the future of Turkic convergence is the reduction of attractiveness of this convergence and the structures around it for the conservative governments of Central Asia, which will probably appear in the form of the following three scenarios:
  

 
As it can be deduced, given Turkey's growing desire to play an effective role in international politics, and consequently, to use the capacity of the Organization of Turkic States in direction of achieving its strategic goals and power-building in the regional and international environment, it is very likely that the members of this organization will encounter more costs due to membership and participation in the mentioned structure; To the extent that even the challenges of Turkish convergence might become more than its opportunities.

On the other hand, the Central Asian countries that are members of OTS have their own strong governance, international image, multilateral roles, and legitimacy bases. So, the continuation of unilateralism of Turkey or the Republic of Azerbaijan and highlighting of their challenging motives, will make Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Kazakh statesmen to doubt about the goals and prospects of Ankara and Baku's role-playing, and will face them with serious questions.

In this context, One of the most important identity issues of this organization is the emergence of a sense of victimization (false or true) in the way of fulfilling Turkey's demands, and turning the positive functions of Turkic convergence into a hostage of Ankara to secure the unilateral interests of this country by using the resources of the member ststes.  

Conclusion
In the issue of Cyprus' membership, it seems that the members of OTS have faced with a fait accompli and submitted to the insistence and emphasis of the Turkish government. In other words, this acceptance rather than being a sign of solidarity and a certain road map of this structure in the political and foreign policy fields, is a sign of complete lack of understanding, unilateralism, and the emergence of a kind of break among the members of this organization.

This lack of understanding has had some external manifestation, including the lack of clarity (not announcing) about the decision to accept Northern Cyprus in the group of Turkic States until the date of the 9th meeting (probably as a result of not reaching an agreement between the members until the last days); the withdrawal of Ashgabat and Budapest from the decision to become a full member of this structure in the final days leading up to November 11 (despite the announcement by the Turkish Foreign Minister); and even the reduction in the level of participation and presence of Turkmenistan, from the head of state to the head of the parliament in this meeting, which is probably not unrelated to Ankara's unilateralism and exclusivity in decisions such as the membership of Northern Cyprus. It is unlikely that a neutral country like Turkmenistan, would accept the political and diplomatic costs of this acceptance. Other Central Asian countries present at the meeting (Uzbekistan as the host, and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) may also have not welcomed the decision of Turkey with ease, and the unveiling of this decision has been delayed until the final moment (and the members faced with a fait accompli imposed by Ankara).

In the 9th meeting of OTS, it seems that the Turkic convergence (as a dynamic and growing process in recent years) and OTS (as an attractive structure with diverse functional areas) have become a victim of Ankara's political decisions; and rather than being a manifestation of the common will of its members, they have become a "hostage" of the government of Turkey to achieve exclusive goals, and a platform for strengthening this country in the international environment.

In other words, the Samarkand meeting showed that the aforementioned structure still has a long way to go in terms of managing conflicting goals and balancing the incompatible interests of the members. This feature, in the analytical perspective, is also the most important vulnerability of Turkic convergence, especially in the perspective of Central Asia. This effective vulnerability has already provided the grounds for the failure or ineffectiveness of any initiative in Russia-centered economic or security mechanisms, and is basically considered as the Achilles Heel of any convergence and structuring in Central Asia, with the presence of powers and actors outside this region.