By: Dr. Hojjat Mianabadi, Seyedeh Zahra Ghoreishi

Introduction
The importance of joint water resources, especially the Helmand international basin, for Iran and Afghanistan throughout the history and especially after the conclusion of the Paris Agreement has led to the formation of intertwined hydro-political interactions between the two countries. Helmand basin is shared between three countries of Afghanistan (82%), Iran (15%) and Pakistan (3%), which is known as Helmand basin in Afghanistan and as Hamun-e- Hirmand basin in Iran. The basin covers 14 provinces of Afghanistan and part of the two Iranian provinces of Sistan & Baluchestan as well as South Khorasan.

The total inflow of the Helmand river basins, which originate from Afghanistan, is estimated at 10 billion cubic meters per year, of which the share of Helmand River (in the upstream of the Kajaki dam) is about 6 billion cubic meters per year. According to the 1973 Agreement, the share of Iran from the Helmand River during the normal and super-normal years is set at 820 million cubic meters per year.

This report seeks to explain the future interactions of the two countries by examining the historical trend of their hydro-political relations and recognizing the influential factors in formation of the hydro-political conflicts and cooperation. Analyzing the historical trend of the past interactions (conflict and cooperation) is a necessary step towards explaining the favorable outlook of the future relations, and this is important for policy-making and sustainable development in the region.

In this report, we first explain the nature of the transboundary water relations and show that in the hydro-political interactions, conflict and cooperation are two sides of the same coin which can occur simultaneously at different levels. Then, the Iran-Afghanistan interactions over the Helmand River as well as the political, security and social events affecting these interactions are explained. Finally, we analyze the current and future state of interactions.
 
Coexistence of cooperation and conflict over shared water resources
Studying history can help us to understand and analyze the current state of a phenomenon. The historical lessons can also formulate more comprehensive strategies and policies for the future. Therefore, investigation of the history of hydro-political relations is very important for identification of the developments as well as proper policy-making. The history of water and hydro-political interactions shows that conflict and cooperation are not necessarily in contrast with each other and can exist dynamically and simultaneously in a basin area.

The hydro-political relations are among the political processes that can simultaneously involve conflict and cooperation. Cooperation, as a concerted effort to achieve a collective result, is a reflective process of the norms and ideas of the actors. Conflict, on the other hand, is a natural and inevitable phenomenon and means conflict of interests. The important point is that "conflict" is not always undesirable and harmful. It can sometimes be a reason for change and a catalyst for shaping cooperation.

In order to analyze the hydro-political interactions as well as levels of cooperation and conflict in the Zaytun and Miramachi (2008) trans-boundary watersheds, five levels are defined to explain cooperation and four levels to explain the levels of conflict between coastal states.The levels of cooperation are respectively: face a problem, joint action, common goal, common norm and collective identity. The levels of conflict are: non-political conflict, politicized conflict, securitized or opportunistic conflict, and violent conflict.
 
Past and present status of Iran-Afghanistan interactions over the Helmand River
The historical and cultural ties between Iran and Afghanistan will never end at once and its consolidation is more than the consolidation of political ties between the two countries. But, the separation of Herat from Iran and the consequences of Treaty of Paris (1857) changed the position of the Helmand River into a trans-boundary river. This change placed Afghanistan upstream of the shared water resources of the Helmand basin. For that reason, Afghanistan became sensitive to the only water source which was available for the development of the two separated regions of Sistan and Nimruz province. Since then, the common resources between the two countries became a transnational issue, and any exploitation of them was made subject to negotiations between the two governments and not the local people- a situation which has created many challenges in these years. 

Given the importance of shared water resources in the Helmand basin for Iran and Afghanistan, the two countries have historically had numerous interactions at various levels and numerous arbitrations have been made between them. According to studies, the levels of conflicts and cooperation in some of the most important hydro-political interactions between Iran and Afghanistan over the Helmand River is divided into 13 time periods, which is presented in Table 1. This division is based on the important water events that occurred over the Helmand River. Given the importance of the issue and the results of this study, some of the most important of these interactions are analyzed and evaluated as follows:

After the failure of McMahon’s arbitration as well as the two countries’ failure to reach a formal and permanent agreement on the issue of Helmand River, Iran and Afghanistan, in 1951, accepted the US proposal for the formation a neutral commission to address the issue. In its final vote, the commission set Iran’s share of the Helmand River at 22 cubic meters per second. But, the result of this arbitration was not accepted by the Iranian side again and the issue of water between Iran and Afghanistan remained unresolved.

After that, in 1955, the formation of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the wake of Cold War played a significant role in changing the course of Iran-Afghanistan relations over water resources. Because under this agreement, the United States decided to reduce its financial assistance to Afghanistan, especially to the development of Helmand, so as not to do anything to the detriment of its allies in this agreement. Thus, since the mid-1960s, the US budget in Afghanistan was reduced to $ 600,000, $ 400,000 and $ 500,000 during 1971, 1972 and 1973, respectively. These changes forced Afghanistan to offer an additional 4 cubic meters of water to Iran. Because Afghanistan needed to receive loans and financial assistance from international institutions to continue the Helmand development project, receiving this loan required determining the water rights of the Helmand water basin and reaching an agreement with Iran. In fact, the international aid is often hard to come by in areas where the status of water distribution is unclear. Accordingly, the Afghan ambassador in London announced during a visit to Iran that the Afghan government has agreed to increase Iran's share from 22 to 26 cubic meters per second.

Finally, in 1973, the Helmand River Treaty was signed and in 1974, it was ratified by the parliaments of the two countries. Following the conclusion of the Helmand River Treaty, the head of the Afghan negotiating team has been praised by various Afghan governments at various times.. Even Ashraf Ghani, during a ceremony in 2016, called the then Prime Minister Mohammad Musa Shafiq as "martyr" and stated: "The treaty that Martyr Musa Shafiq signed with Iran over the Helmand River was totally in favor of the Afghan people."  

On the other hand, the Afghan media mounted an extensive propaganda about the Helmand Treaty and claimed that it is necessary to erect a statue of Musa Shafiq in the squares of Nimruz and Kabul cities due to the numerous benefits of this treaty for Afghanistan. Ettela'at newspaper quoted an Afghan analyst: "The signing of this agreement was necessary for Afghanistan.

This agreement can attract international investment for the development of Helmand. If the problem of Helmand water distribution was not solved, Afghanistan would not be able to provide the necessary development funds for the region, and international financial institutions would not pay attention to Afghanistan's proposals for loans and credits.” The officials at the Afghan Ministry of Energy and Water also stressed that if Afghanistan's water disputes with the neighboring countries were not resolved, the international community would not be willing to invest in the country’s water storage and electricity projects. Therefore, documents and studies show that the Helmand Treaty was fruitful for Afghanistan, because it made Afghanistan able to pretend that the Helmand water disputes are over and, hence, receive more technical and financial assistance for its development projects in this basin.

The second motivating factor for Afghanistan to sign the Helmand Treaty at that time was obtaining the Iranian authorities’ consent to get access to open waterways. Because until 1955, about 80 percent of Afghanistan’s imports and exports had been carried out through Pakistan. But at that year, the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan soured over the Pashtunistan issue, which halted the flow of goods through Pakistan. This highlighted the importance of Iran's transit routes, especially Bandar Abbas, for Afghanistan, because Afghanistan is a landlocked country and it always needs to find a new way to get access to the open waters to meet its transit and trade challenges. Therefore, during this period, the country tried to make more concessions to Iran by providing an additional 4 cubic meters of water.

Despite a formal agreement, the differences between the two countries over water remained unresolved, because there was no water right for the environment and Hamun Wetlands in the agreement. At the time of the treaty, Iran was merely trying to obtain a certain and guaranteed water for the agricultural consumption of the people of Sistan, and the conditions of that period persuaded Iran to accept the treaty. It shows that neither of the two countries paid attention to the issue of environmental water supply at that time, and so the environmental water right of Hamun Wetlands remained silent.

Iran's demand for an environmental water right made some media outlets and officials to incite the Afghan people’s nationalistic sentiment. This trend has made the Afghan government reluctant to reach a final joint solution over other common waters with Iran, and on the other hand, they are seriously trying to accelerate their water projects with the help of the third countries. This measures destroyed the environment of Hamun Waterlands, created a source of dust storms in the region (as a result of which acute respiratory diseases have spread), and endangered the human (socio-economic) security of the region. In short, the economic, political and environmental consequences of reducing the water right of the Helmand River have brought about various social changes in the Great Sistan region.
 
Table (1): Analysis of Iran-Afghanistan relations over the Helmand River, using the TWINS matrix

 

Source: Qureshi, Seyedeh Zahra; Miyanaabadi, Hojjat; Parvaresh Rizi,Atefeh (1400). Correlation matrix analysis of transboundary water interactions in Helmand catchment, Iranian Soil and Water Research, 52 (1): 273-300
 
As mentioned earlier, the analysis of the hydro-political interactions of the two countries will be an attempt to understand the current situation and improve the future interactions. An examination of the history of water interactions between Iran and Afghanistan shows that the issue of Helmand water has often been at the political level (Table 1). Therefore, bargaining over purely technical issues cannot improve the situation in this basin. The two countries rather need to grab the existing opportunities for cooperation in a bid to gain each other's satisfaction and create an interaction based on the interests of both parties. This will highlight the importance of depoliticizing the water relations in order to avoid any political friction.

The results of studying the history of hydro-political relations between the two countries over Helmand also show that the mediation of the third countries has always worsened the situation. The foreign third countries directly and indirectly (with a direct presence in the region, in the past; And in two direct and indirect ways, and using soft tools such as media, now) have sought to drive a wedge between the people of the Great Sistan and the people of Iran and Afghanistan, which highlights the importance of paying serious attention to this issue.
 
The prospect of hydro-political interactions between the two countries
Understanding the history of hydro-political relations between the two countries and explaining the factors affecting the conflict and cooperation in the Helmand catchment, can help us to understand the effective changes in these interactions. These studies show that the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the rise of the Taliban, and the likely changes in the foreign investments in Afghanistan will affect the water relations with Iran. Here an attempt has been made to understand the pattern of the upcoming changes, considering the past developments:

1- The US withdrawal from Afghanistan
Following the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan in the mid-1960s, the country's budget for the continuation of structural projects in the Helmand Valley was reduced. As a result, Afghanistan was in an urgent need to raise funds for its construction projects. So, along with a number of other factors, it was persuaded to enter into an agreement with Iran on the Helmand River in order to receive more foreign loans and grants.

Now, in the wake of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the country may once again go after lending from the international organizations. Of course, this does not mean that the United States will leave Afghanistan alone. Since addressing the water needs of the Hamuns is a customary obligation for Iran and Afghanistan, so fulfillment of this commitment can be the condition of the international organizations‌ for participation in Afghanistan's hydropower projects. Therefore, just as the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1972 led to Helmand Treaty, the country’s withdrawal in 2021 may seriously affect the existing hydro-political relations between Iran and Afghanistan. However, the external factors influencing the Iran-Afghanistan hydro-political interactions are vast and not limited to the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan.

2- The possible increase of Taliban role
If, as a result of the Afghan peace talks, the Taliban enters the Afghan government, the chance of an end to war and instability in Afghanistan and the emergence of a more uniform and powerful government increases. A strong government is able to make more serious decisions on significant issues, and is more stable in its interactions with the neighboring countries. On this basis, more political will is created to address the disputed issues. Therefore, the presence of the Taliban in the government may create more serious and at the same time more complex conditions for the disputed issues between Iran and Afghanistan.

3- The possible change in foreign investments in Afghanistan
Some analysts believe that the US withdrawal from Afghanistan will put the Taliban in power, and since Pakistan still maintains a strong alliance with the group, this could be an important strategic barrier against the Indian infiltration into Afghanistan. Undoubtedly, India's declining presence could affect Afghanistan's water relations with its neighbors.

India shares water borders with its neighbors (China, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh) and is facing serious problems in terms of the international watersheds. However, India has sought to invest in water projects of Afghanistan (such as the Salma dam on the Harirud River and the Shahtoot dam on the Kabul River) and increase its influence in the country in a bid to use Afghanistan’s water resources against its longtime rival, Pakistan.

In general, to analyze India's foreign policy towards Afghanistan, it is important to study the two principles of "political siege" and "strategic partnership." The term "political siege" was first coined by Kautilya and has always been a fundamental principle in the Indian foreign policy.

According to Kautilya philosophy, neighbors (Pakistan and China) are considered enemies and the direct enemy of these neighbors (Afghanistan) is considered as friend. Thus, as part of this philosophy, the Indians have taken advantage of the differences between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the Durand Line and established close ties with Afghanistan. The rise of the Taliban, and consequently Pakistan, could affect the presence of the Indian forces as well as New Delhi’s investment in Afghanistan. This will also prevent India from using Afghanistan's water resources for its own foreign policy purposes.

India’s extensive constructions over the shared water resources between Afghanistan and its coastal states is largely pursued for political purposes, because India itself is facing a very severe water crisis and needs to address its own domestic needs in the first place. Nevertheless, the Indian government has shifted its focus to Afghanistan’s water resources by constructing various dams in the country's transboundary watersheds. Undoubtedly, the upcoming political changes can affect the investments in this field. Accordingly, the forthcoming developments can prevent the social changes envisaged by India and provide a favorable environment for sustainable development in Afghanistan which meets the needs of all stakeholders in a catchment rather than using water to gain power and influence over the other side. Meanwhile, it is important to note that the use of Afghanistan's transboundary water resources for the interests of the foreign countries which are present in Afghanistan is not limited to India.
 
Conclusion
All above issues, along with Iran's very high desire for cooperation with the regional countries to create a mechanism of collective security in development infrastructures of the region, show that the upcoming interactions and current conflicts between Iran and Afghanistan over Helmand water- which many analysts say is the most important issue affecting good relations between the two countries - has the potential to be a catalyst for changing the course of the conflicts and moving towards cooperation and formation of a common goal between Iran and Afghanistan. Undoubtedly, the hydro-political relations between Iran and Afghanistan over the issue of Helmand will undergo serious changes that can be a factor for sustainable growth and development of the region.