By: omid rahimi

Introduction
Despite having stability in terms of long-term and macro policies, the United States changes its tactical and mid-term approaches by changes in the executive branch of the government (the president and some parts of decision-making bodies). The extent and depth of this change is commensurate with the interests that the United States defines in different regions of the world and in interaction with other actors. Naturally, the level of this change would be different for each region such as Southwest Asia or Europe. In general, however, the hypothesis is that with the change of president and the executive branch of government, there will be some change in US behavior toward the target areas. So, with Donald Trump's ouster and inauguration of a Democratic president, Joe Biden, Washington's behavioral changes in Central Asia can also be expected.
To assess these changes, several issues should be considered, including Trump and Biden's previous interactions with Central Asian countries, Trump's executive actions, Biden announcements, and the behavior of regional actors.
 
Trump & Central Asia
With the policy of "America First," Donald Trump practically proved that he pays more attention to the domestic issues rather than foreign policy. In the field of foreign policy, he tried to reduce Washington’s activism in the regional systems and strengthen its macro-management at the international level via some measures such as reduction of the US participation in NATO or withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan according to the cost & benefit logic.
Instead, in areas such as relations with Russia and China, and acting in South America and parts of Southwest Asia (including Iran), he was active with an aggressive approach. In the context of this foreign policy behavior, Trump pursued a general policy called the "Heart of Asia" for the entire Indo-Pacific region, which also included the US macro policy in Central Asia.
The development of economic partnerships and security cooperation with the United States, and regime building were among the goals of this strategy. However, the evaluation of some American think tanks and media outlets shows Trump’s failure to achieve its predetermined goals and lack of a tangible vision for the continuation of this strategy. In Central Asia, the output of this strategy can be seen in the US plan to connect Central Asia to South Asia - a strategy that has long been existed in the US State Department, but the Trump administration put it on top of the agenda with a particular focus on the Afghanistan Initiative.
In this context, achieving peace in Afghanistan under any circumstances, the gradual withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan, and completion of semi-finished projects such as the TAPI gas pipeline or the Casa-1000 power transmission line were considered by Washington.
Of course, in line with the Trump administration's aggressive approach, there seems to have been a Plan B with a focus on Central Asia’s security, possibly aimed at imposing heavy costs on China, Russia, and to a lesser extent Iran. As Donald Trump nears its final days in the office, the acceleration of these strategies is clearly visible.
 
Biden & Central Asia
Under Donald Trump, the liberal values ​​of American foreign policy have clearly waned, both politically and economically, and the realist and mercantilist options took priority. From this view, the return of a democratic president to power in the United States can somehow interpret as restoration of the liberal values. Meanwhile, note that in Senate - unlike the government-, the Republican forces are in majority, and if Biden comes to power, the Republican approaches will continue to dominate the Senate as an important decision-making center in the US foreign policy. Given all these terms, the possible consequences of Biden presidency for Central Asia are as follow:

Tension in bilateral relations 
Although the Democratic administrations in the United States are inherently subject to the realist policy-making methods, they practically act in line with liberal practices. This can show itself in the form of economic liberalization, the rise of human rights in foreign policy, the imposition of democratic values, and even the implementation of velvet revolutions. This approach can also put a lot of pressure on the authoritarian governments of Central Asia. While Donald Trump clearly turned a blind eye on human rights and civil liberties issues in the region, the Biden administration expected to be tougher on such issues. This can lead to harsh reactions from Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, and push Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan towards more conservatism and Russification. In addition, regarding the post-election tensions in Kyrgyzstan, it would make the country’s path towards stability more difficult.

Developing covert relationships 
During his tenure as Barack Obama's vice president, Joe Biden showed that he has a special interest in Eurasian authoritarian governments, despite the official view of the Democratic administration that he was working. The case of Hunter Biden, son of Joe Biden, in which he has allegedly received large sums of money from the regional oligarchs, can easily prove this claim. Among the Central Asian countries, Joe Biden is enjoying personal ties with circles close to Nursultan Nazarbayev via a number of political figures such as Karim Massimov (the current head of the security apparatus and former prime minister), Timur Kulibayev (Nazarbayev's son-in-law), and even Kenes Rakishev (famous capitalist). These ties, which are probably more than simple contacts with some oligarchs, can be strengthened after Biden’s inauguration and, despite the tensions with the regional governments over the liberal values, result in close and secret interactions with the oligarchs of the second circle.

Focusing on multilateral frameworks
One of the special areas that the Biden administration will focus on is regime-building through the regional political frameworks, such as the C5+1- a policy that the Trump administration started but did not have a specific plan and seriousness to advance it. These multilateral approaches will play a more prominent role in the Biden administration in terms of resource distribution. This means that the new administration will probabley increase the activities of institutions such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and strengthen support for indigenous governmental and non-governmental organizations, in order to carry out structural reforms in the region. In this approach, the Uzbek government is likely to receive special attention as a pilot to inspire other countries. In other words, Washington’s stick and carrot policy in Central Asia will continue with stick at the bilateral level and carrot at the multilateral level. The ultimate goal of this strategy would be regime-building in order to gradually change the behavior of countries in the region.

Convergence with other actors 
In the face of the Central Asian countries, the Trump administration, despite focusing on bilateral relations, took a unilateral approach and reduced the role of proxy actors. This was particularly evident in the transient divergences with the EU policies in Central Asia. However, it seems that in the Biden administration, we will see a significant increase in coordination with the European Union and the promotion of proxy actors such as India and South Korea. The only exception can happen in the case of Turkey. Joe Biden has sharply criticized Recep Tayyip Erdogan's policies during his campaign and threatened to boycott or even oust him from power. These differences, if intensified at the level of Washington-Ankara bilateral relations, will also reduce Turkey's role in Central Asia.

Tactical change in Afghanistan
Along with normalization of ties with the Zionist regime and “the deal of the century”, The Afghan peace process was also one of the Trump administration’s foreign policy priorities. Meanwhile, Biden noted in his election campaign that he would change the US policy in South Asia. This issue will play a key role in the foreign policy of the new US administration, especially given Biden’s failed experience in Afghanistan under the Obama administration. Meanwhile, it should be noted that the influential presence of Republicans in the Senate will force Biden to pursue the strategic goals of Trump’s plan, while making serious changes at the tactical level. Although the nature and mechanism of this plan are still unclear, it would definitely lead to the increasing role of the Central Asian countries (especially Uzbekistan), the escalation of tensions with the Taliban, and the limited militarization of the border areas between Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

Reducing the depth and increasing the level of tensions with China and Russia
Donald Trump clearly pursued aggressive and radical policies toward China and Russia. Entering a trade war with China and leaving the military agreements with Russia are the examples of these policies. However, the Biden administration appears to be focusing on expanding its sphere of opposition to the actions of China and Russia with a focus on liberal values, while at the same time trying to reduce the depth of tensions on key issues. In Central Asia, it would primarily happen in the form of rejecting Trump's plan B for the region. Earlier, Russia and China responded to this plan by tightening security measures and expanding military operations in Central Asia. Meanwhile, tensions with China and Russia will escalate following Biden’s focus on a number of issues such as the Uyghurs, Sinophobia, and de-Sovietization. This approach is in fact a balancing mechanism that would prevent Russianism and Chineseism in the region in the case of any bilateral tension with Washington.

Decreasing the security image of diplomatic staff
During Trump’s tenure, we have seen an increase in the security activities of the US ambassadors and diplomatic staff in the region. This was particularly the case for Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, which play a key role in US policy in Afghanistan. In fact, the security image of these new diplomatic cadres led to a decrease in positive role of the United States in the social and economic fields. But Joe Biden's administration is expected to revert this trend and once again push the US diplomatic staff towards social activities.

Increasing the cost of power transition
Under Donald Trump, we saw three power transitions in Central Asia, including Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The most prominent feature of theses transitions, especially in the case of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, was the full support of the United States for the proposals of the regional leaders. In Kazakhstan, although the United States made some moves, it generally put cooperation with Nazarbayev and alignment with Tokayev on the agenda. It has also deliberately turned a blind eye to the existing undemocratic trends in Uzbekistan. Also, in the case of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, Washington appears to be seeking concessions in exchange for silence about the transfer of power to Rustam and Sardar. However, the Biden's government is expected to challenge the plans of the authoritarian leaders of the region on a larger scale. The level and degree of hidden interactions (as Previously mentioned in this report) is a factor that will determine the extent to which transmission costs increase at the public level.

 
Conclusion
The Biden administration will naturally take a different approach towards Central Asia, which will definitely contain new opportunities and threats for the Islamic Republic of Iran. At the macro level, Trump's ouster may decrease some of the strategic threats that his Central Asia policy could impose on Iran. Meanwhile, it may undermine the logic of Russia and China’s engagement with Iran and would weaken some process such as Iran's membership in Shanghai Cooperation Organization as well as its counterterrorism efforts, particularly in Afghanistan. Moreover, the presence of the United States and other proxy actors in Central Asia will likely increase and Iran-based initiatives would be less attractive to the Central Asian republics. Meanwhile, with increasing tensions in bilateral relations on issues such as the promotion of democracy and human rights, there would be new opportunities for joint alignment with Iran on political issues.
Taking advantage of these opportunities and threats largely depends on the active role the Islamic Republic of Iran would play in Central Asia to regain its influence in the region.

Omid Rahimi, is a Researcher at the Institute for East Strategic Studies